


November 8, 1949

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The Reporter

U. S. STRATEGY



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Takeoff of a Boeing XB-47 Stratojet Bomber



November 8, 1949

The Reporter

A fortnightly of facts and ideas

Volume 1, No. 15

U. S. Strategy

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We have reached a turning point. Suddenly a recent past, that we were getting used to, exploded on some distant Russian testing ground. Now we are compelled to make a basic re-evaluation of our policy in all its aspects. We call them by different names: foreign and domestic policy, economics, strategy—they form an indivisible whole. We have lost many of our illusions, our thinking and planning are now brought down to earth; but we are not particularly bruised. In fact, we think we can take it.

But we must look now where we are going, and we must set goals proportionate to our means. For, confronted now with many difficulties at home and abroad, we see that there are limits to our power and our resources, and that we must budget them for the tasks ahead.

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The Time Is Noon



Things have been happening these last few weeks, momentous things that had to happen, that we knew would happen. We had been waiting for the other shoe to fall on the floor above; all of a sudden quite a few shoes banged down at the same time. But no sane person had any right to be startled when it became known that the Russians too had produced an atomic bomb, when the pound was devalued, when a new Communist People's Republic was proclaimed in Peiping, when our admirals burst out with facts that many civilians had known for some time but could not easily talk about.

These events, all foreseen, all happening somewhat ahead of schedule, all carry the same message: Our country cannot gain any total or partial dispensation from world leadership. We cannot buy or shoot our way out of world leadership, nor can we farm it out to Britain or entrust it unreservedly to the United Nations. Our safety cannot be guaranteed by the possession of any one absolute weapon. The European or world economy will not be reset by any once-and-for-all plan. We are in the business of world politics for keeps.

No Escape Through Bigness

The explosion of the atomic bomb at the end of the last war gave us a shock from which we can only now recover. Man's tools of destruction have always had a range equal to that of his instruments of production. The extension of the arm is the sword, of our world-girdling economy, the atomic bomb. The span that the techniques and the skill of man can reach and control has always been capped by instruments of death. But we thought perhaps that the invention of tools that go infinitely beyond the reach of our eyes and our senses, the achievement through technology of an economic structure that rings the earth, had given us a power of such magnitude that it could never be smothered by any instrument of death.

Since President Truman made his announcement

on August 6, 1945, the American people have been seized at the same time by desire to be freed from that horrible thing and by fear of being robbed of it. They have tried to be forgiven for having the secret while boasting about it. They have tried to give it away while keeping it. They have congratulated themselves and received from others countless congratulations; for it was a guarantee of peace that such a weapon was in the hands of a virtuous nation.

Now, another nation, not renowned for its virtue, possesses the atomic secret. We had better start getting accustomed to a very uncomfortable idea: the world that technology has gigantically enriched is not going to be saved from destruction by the jealously-kept secrets of American science.

Our horizon has been immensely broadened by man-made technological and scientific tools, but, broad as it is, it can still be shut off by man-made instruments of death. The most technologically advanced nation has no longer the God-like exclusive custody of these earth-wrecking secrets. It is no use now for Senator Hickenlooper to sit on these secrets, for they no longer exempt America from the hazards and ordeals of other people. The weapons that we thought could deter our potential enemy from making war can boomerang on us. From now on, our safety depends on a daring and wise policy much more than on superior technology. Again, we are in for keeps.

Our Self-Appointed Heirs

One thing seems to be certain. The Russians, in no way overwhelmed by their own discovery, have put the bomb alongside international Communism and their allegedly radar-proof submarines in the arsenal of their weapons. The bomb gives them the reassuring feeling of being even with us, but they do not seem inclined to see in it the absolute tool that will make their offensive irresistible and their defense impregnable.

In fact, it is reasonable to assume that the Russian strategists plan to use the bomb rather sparingly and mostly for purposes of retaliation. They do not want

to destroy the industrial equipment of enemy nations: They want to capture it. Pittsburgh and Detroit, or to mention closer targets, the industries of the Ruhr Basin and of the Po Valley, are alluring prey that one day, as Marx and Lenin taught them, they expect to incorporate into their worldwide trust. Capitalism, they have been told, has created the great industrial compounds, but cannot keep them in steady operation. Capitalism for them is the architect and the contractor of a house that it cannot live in.

President Truman and Secretary Stimson said that the bombs had to be dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in order to save the lives of perhaps a million American boys. Stalin and his successors are not likely to be so stingy with the lives of Russian soldiers. Authoritarian régimes do not go in for strategic bombing or mass destruction unless it is to hamper the enemy's advance. Hitler wanted to use the productive machinery of France and the skill of the French workers for the benefit of his own war production. He waged his war as great generals of the past have always done: in order to outflank, defeat and capture the armies of the enemy nation. He used weapons of wholesale and indiscriminate annihilation to break the nerve of enemy people. He never stopped waging a war of nerves, and sometimes he went to incredible extremes to wring the nerves of enemy people. Stalin fought his war as Hitler did. He fought ruthlessly, surgically, never failing to emphasize that his war was against the German Army and the "Hitlerite beasts."

Totalitarian conquerors want to turn the skillful workers of industrially-advanced nations into productive slaves. The dictators are a very old-fashioned type of men and they are not likely to rely too heavily on new fancy weapons of wanton destruction. Hitler sought other people's territory by sheer right of conquest. The Russian Communists think that the whole world is willed to them by the laws of history.

The Meek Warmongers

Last time, total war and unconditional surrender were our own answers to totalitarian aggression. We smashed the productive machinery of the enemy in his own territory and in the lands he had conquered. We reduced his cities to rubble. Then we proceeded to rebuild what we had destroyed and to feed the people who had survived our bombardment. Not only have we fed them, but we have undertaken to re-educate them and, as in the case of Germany, to de-Nazify them.

The enemy of tomorrow may, like the enemy of yesterday, use war to foster his policy of conquest, when he decides that he can go to war with the least

possible risk and acquire the ownership of our lives and of our properties. He wants *his* peace—a peace for which he has all the blueprints ready—according to a timetable that he may occasionally have to revise, but whose destination he is bound to reach if history obeys his laws.

We, on the contrary, want peace, just peace. We do not want to conquer any enemy territory. We hate war. We want to do away once and for all with wars and with warmakers. We thought the First World War was the war to end all wars. The last time, the Four Freedoms had no more specific field of geographic application assigned to them than "anywhere in the world." Our indiscriminate wholesale idealism leads us to fight wars of indiscriminate wholesale destruction. Then we start the whole process of rebuilding the enemy nations and re-educating their people. Should war break out with Soviet Russia and should we receive the surrender of the ruined, bombed-out Russian people, we would have on our hands the task of de-Bolshevizing them. We would probably have to subject the people of China to the same treatment. It might turn out to be a rather ponderous undertaking.

The events of the last few weeks have shown that we are far from having completed the payment of the commitments we incurred in fighting the Axis. In planning now, as we must, for a possible new war, we should consider its cost in its entirety: from the production of atomic bombs to the expenses that the ensuing Recovery Program would entail. The membership of a properly organized Defense Council would extend, so to speak, from David Lilienthal, who is responsible for the manufacture of atomic bombs, to Paul Hoffman, who has to reassemble with means provided by the American people what American weapons have destroyed. Incidentally, in such a set-up our military men whose function is to plan and run campaigns would be reduced to their proper place. Such a council might conceivably reach the conclusion that the plan repeatedly announced by General Bradley of "an immediate strategic air offensive with atomic bombs" would produce a havoc that Paul Hoffman could never hope to repair.

Last time, we followed a straight path, after having established the policy of unconditional surrender, from strategic bombing to life-saving atom blasts to UNRRA to ECA and assistance to Asia. Last time, even as inspired a man as President Roosevelt could not find any other definition for our war than "war of survival." Recently William H. Hessler has written an admirable book on how to avoid the next war. It is called "Operation Survival." This emphasis on survival is ominous. When a nation has always to fight for survival, it may, at the end, with the help of luck, just barely manage to survive. We

are the most powerful nation on earth and our war-making potential is incomparably greater than that of our prospective enemy, but, strong as we are, it is doubtful whether we could afford to fight a new war the way we fought the last.

The Kind of People We Are

It is useless to talk of our past mistakes and to assess responsibilities. Perhaps we could not avoid fighting the last war the way we did. For we are a democracy, and the continental democracy of the United States, incomparably different from the town-meeting democracies of times past, is still the newest, least-tried, and most adventurous form of government on this earth. There has been no dearth in history of conquering generals or of tyrants. Stalin can fall back on the teaching of the great conquerors of the past, from Alexander down. In fact he is a very old-fashioned product of this tradition. President Roosevelt had nobody to look back to, not the founding fathers who led a small sparsely populated country, nor Pericles who ruled a tiny democracy where freedom was the privilege of the few.

In a continental democracy the political evolution of the people, who are the protagonists of political life, proceeds in a massive way, according to incomparable patterns, and on an unprecedented scale. American democracy is the only great novelty in modern history—a novelty which we find difficult to apprehend because we are part of it. Our political evolution during the last twenty years is a phenomenon of oceanic proportions.

Yet, we still have an attitude toward war not consistent with our will to have peace in our country and the world. We go on relying on the one-shot, hit-and-run effort to put ourselves and the world on an even keel. The *ism* has been clipped out of our isolationism, but the longing for a life of peace between our own shores, undisturbed by the turbulence of the outside world, still remains. The hope lingers that if only we can pay the ransom of billions of dollars that the world seems determined to extract from us, then we can really go back to our own business.

This nation is largely made up of immigrants—mostly from Europe, the old center of wars. Nearly every American is the descendant of an immigrant or an immigrant himself who got a break—at least the break to come to America. This nation has been made by the work and ingenuity of folks who thought they had cut their ties with the old world once and for all. In their own way, ruling themselves as well as they could, facing each problem as it came, these immigrants have attained a stable order and full release of their productive capacities. It turns out now

that the American experiment cannot in any way remain the peculiar and exclusive privilege of the American people.

U. S. Strategy

The political stability and the productivity we have reached in America must gradually be extended to other nations. This implies an enormous job of reconstruction over a very long period of time—a job that cannot be done in a hit-and-run way, or according to any ludicrous timetable of preordained history. We have to learn how to become poised in the use of our strength, how not to shoot it out in suicidal cycles of destruction and reconstruction and rehabilitation, and how to call the lie on the timetables of our enemies. It is difficult for a democracy like ours to develop a sustained foreign policy, and to assign to itself, in time of war, any other overriding aim than just to win. But American democracy has overcome even greater difficulties. A continent has been settled by men living under free institutions—something that had never been done before; the nation has avoided being splintered, even by an irrepressible Civil War; and, in our times, brakes have been put on the disastrous cycle of boom and bust.

We must now develop an American policy and an American strategy related to very long-range aims, if we want to tackle the immediate problems that are upon us. The most urgent of all these problems is to regain the political offensive and to dispel all the misconceptions spread about us by our opponents lies and our own awkwardness. People in friendly and unfriendly countries must become utterly convinced that, should a new war come, we do not intend to shower recklessly and alternatively bombs and bounties on the nations that we undertake to liberate.

There seems to be no reason why our government should not assume the initiative of proposing that any future war be limited to the conflict between the armed forces of the enemy nations. Our power, and the power of all the other United Nations on our side, could be used to punish any government that indulges in genocide or uses weapons designed primarily against civilian populations. If such a policy were announced at the U.N. and became embodied in binding international agreements, no iron curtain or censorship could keep people everywhere in the world from recognizing us for what we are.

This could be the first move of our strategy of peace—a strategy that, to be successful, needs only to be consistent with our traditions and interests. We have it in our power to overwhelm our opponents and not just to survive.

—M. A.

Policy and Strategy

The Russian bomb doesn't seem to increase the likelihood of war; it does suggest more emphasis on land, less on air, for America



It is idle to insist that the recent explosion in Russia changes nothing—just because we have known all along that the Soviets would eventually manufacture an atomic weapon. It is no small change to have vague forebodings replaced by a sense of immediacy. Perhaps now some of the vagueness may be dispelled, for, as Samuel Johnson said, "When a man knows he is to be hanged in a fortnight, it concentrates his mind wonderfully."

To be sure, we may find after due concentration that we are not in danger of execution after all—at any rate, not soon. For whatever else the detonation in Siberia has done, it does not appear to have increased the likelihood of war. In spite of all the alarms and excursions of the last two years, that likelihood has so far been quite small. Let us consider why.

Whatever the Russians may have thought about the inevitability of a capitalist attack on them, they would have been incredibly insensitive if they had not realized that the decision for war or peace has been for some time in their hands. All the crises and slanders in recent East-West relations have stemmed from one of the cardinal commandments of the Russian faith—that they are morally obligated to test the full measure of the opposition, to get the last tittle the strong enemy can be induced peaceably to yield. To settle for less has always been considered—in Leninist ideology—a betrayal. Along with that principle, the Russians have another, which makes that faith a good deal less dangerous—the doctrine of the strategic retreat. To be forced to retreat periodically from an exposed

position is wholly commendable from the Soviet point of view; it proves that Russia has gone the limit of the feasible in pressing its cause. In Bolshevik thinking, there is something intrinsically good about retreats.

The American formula of "patience with firmness" has, if anything, abetted this Soviet strategy. It assures the Russians that their reconnaissance can be made without undue hazard, and their retreats without pursuit. As a democracy whose citizens are horrified by the thought of war, we are incapable of impatience; our firmness has been pretty much a negative business of halting the flow of concessions at some arbitrarily-chosen point.

Such an arrangement can operate without violent explosion only when both parties have a profound disinclination for war. Ours is there for all to see. The Soviet Union—whatever the difference in motives—appears equally eager to avoid war, at least a major war against powerful opponents. The Soviet Union is a "have" nation with respect to revolutionary attainments. Its leadership would look upon any policy that jeopardized these accomplishments as the most reckless kind of "criminal opportunism." It has other ways, less risky, and far from ineffective, of

pushing the Communist Revolution. In addition, the scars left by the last war are painful and deep, and require long healing. Moreover, Russian Communism, unlike Hitlerism, has one saving grace: It does not appear to be guided by a narrow and rigid timetable in the accomplishment of its objectives. It is always ready to be persuaded that the time for violence is not yet.

How does Russia's possession of the bomb affect all this? It obviously does not encourage the Russians to dismiss our power lightly. We have many more

TRUMAN REVEALS RED A-BLAST




GOVERNOR DEWEY: "We are really going to need brains in the Senate from this day on. John Foster Dulles . . . is the only man in the world today the Russians are afraid of."

bombs, and better ones, and we probably will have for a long time to come. Indeed, now that they have the bomb and we know it, they must be less anxious about our pushing our advantage. The talk of "preventive war" in this country, though it never amounted to much, was probably magnified by the time it reached Moscow. Whether or not the Russians took it seriously, they will probably hear less of it from now on. In the diplomatic and political pressures that they have been exerting they were in any case pressing the limits of what they considered "safe." The recent development does not—at least for the present—change those limits. Nor can it make the Russians less wary about going beyond them.

Having ventured so much, we must inject a note of caution. Obviously, there is a better chance that war can be avoided over the next ten years than over the next twenty. Even assuming no change in the basic caution on both sides, all sorts of things can happen. The Russians' sense of what is safe and what is unsafe may become blunted with time and overfrequent use. Or they may become accustomed to relying unduly on the blackmail effects of their growing stockpile of atomic bombs—or comparable weapons of destruction. For our part, we may, under the stress of mounting anxieties, decide in desperation on a final liquidation of our worries. One or more conceivable developments may indeed reverse such a trend, but the point is that we must distinguish between the short term and the long when we discuss probabilities of war. Our policy decisions must take account of both.

These considerations bring us to an unorthodox view (which we would, in any case, reach on other grounds)—that the relationship of foreign policy to military strength is indirect, and, for most day-to-day policy decisions, quite irrelevant. Military power is a guarantee of our ability to meet the ultimate challenge which any or all of our policies may provoke. Our military strength gives us room for policy maneuver by discouraging aggression. But that is a very different thing from insisting, as it has become fashionable to do, that our foreign and our military policies are two aspects of the same thing, that neither can proceed without constant reference to the other.

TRUMAN REVEALS RED A-BLAST



DR. HEWLETT JOHNSON, "Red Dean" of Canterbury: *"I also know [the Russians] are more interested in atomic power for industrial purposes than in making explosions to kill people."*

Until recently, our country cheerfully disregarded the uses of power in the advancement of a diplomatic position. After the settlement of the Oregon Dispute a century ago, the French Ambassador in Washington wrote: "Just to see how events unroll in this country, one would say that there is something providential in the success that crowns the enterprises of the young republic, for it seems to act more by the instinct of its destiny than by serious reflection on its power." But about the time of the Second World War, there seems to have been in Washington a sudden and profound revulsion against such "irresponsibility." The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee was set up during the war, and the National Security Council soon after it. This new approach, as preached by both civilian and military leaders, involves a kind of calculus—as though one could draw a series of nice equations in which more military strength permits more-venturesome diplomacy, and vice versa. There are at least two dangers in this approach: Any diplomatic tension or "crisis" has an all-too-immediate influence upon our military appropriations, and, even more important, our foreign policy may be robbed of aggressiveness whenever the armed forces point to their current unreadiness to "support" a bold decision. There is only one kind

of war we have to worry about, and this is really quite enough to absorb all the attention of our military. A war with the Soviet Union would be more or less the same regardless of *how* or *where* it started. It would no doubt make a good deal of difference *when* it started; but in any given period of time we are dealing with a more-or-less fixed quantity. Our foreign policy does not, in general, affect the kind of war we may have to fight, but affects rather the chance that we shall have to fight it. A few divisions or air groups more or less can never be the excuse for choosing one policy rather than another *unless* one of the policies *drastically* increases the risk of war and unless, too, the divisions or air groups in question make a critical difference in whether or not we are ready for the risk.

If we are dealing with policy choices which vary in riskiness but none of which is excessively risky, our current military posture has nothing to do with our decision. Practically none of the policies we have had to choose between since the end of the war appear to have entailed anything more than small risk. Granted that we are known to be a great military power, the kinds of resources that count most in governing our policy decisions are the moral, the intellectual, and the economic—in about that order of importance.

There is, however, one major field in which foreign policy and military strategy are indeed most intimately related. This is the field of peacetime alliances. The United States has just made, in the Atlantic Pact, its first major alliance since the one concluded with France in the early days of our republic. Our arrangements with Latin America are simply to formalize obligations which we had long since owned—and make them work both ways. And our obligations under the aborted "enforcement provisions" of the United Nations Charter were at once too limited and far too general to influence our strategy seriously. The Atlantic Pact directly commits us for the first time to defend non-American territories beyond the seas. Clearly, if we assumed this far-reaching commitment with a clear understanding of how we would fulfill it, our policy would have to be guided by existing strategic concepts which would in turn mold our subsequent military development.

That is not to say that there necessarily was any such understanding. It is conceivable that military judgments were held of minor account on the one occasion when they were most clearly relevant. There was a certain generous abandon about the way we invited nations, big and little, into the fold, which suggests that military considerations were at best secondary. It is difficult to see how the three armed services, especially the Air Force and the Navy, could have been brought so smoothly together on the military implications of the treaty when they differ so conspicuously on basic strategic issues, unless they thought the treaty was of no immediate concern militarily. Two things about the pact are, however, clear. First, when it was signed, the United States had atomic bombs and the Soviet Union was expected to have them shortly. And secondly, the western European states made it quite explicit that in the event of war they expect not to be rescued from occupation but defended against invasion.

Over the short run, the Atlantic Pact obviously represents a liability to us. At present, we and our allies could not cope with the Soviet armies in western Europe. On the other hand, our partners are implicitly obligated under the pact to build up their armed

forces. Given time and luck—plus the ERP and the MAP—they will no doubt do so. Certainly, in military planning, we must consider that perhaps in five to ten years our allies will have quite respectable land forces of their own. At a moment of crisis, Russia's atomic bomb might induce them to cancel our obligations, but that is by no means a foregone conclusion. If the states to which we are bound are determined to resist under attack, what then?

If there were a more-or-less stable land front in Europe, or any hope of creating one, we would have to contribute at the minimum vast amounts of material resources, and no doubt military manpower as well. General Omar N. Bradley, as Army Chief of Staff, argued during the Senate hearings on the pact that it was precisely the fact that Russia would have the atomic bomb that made the pact necessary to us, since something like the Normandy landing, costly and hazardous enough under the conditions of the Second World War, would then be impossible. In other words, the Atlantic Pact, though admittedly a military liability over the short term, is envisaged as not only a political asset now but also as a military asset in the not-too-remote future.

Such views and commitments, however, conflict most violently with the

strategic theory to which the United States Air Force seems to have subscribed almost to a man—the theory of victory through airpower alone, or at least through airpower predominantly. And there can be no doubt that the atomic bomb has enormously revived what might have otherwise been the discounted Douhet thesis. A commitment to defend the United Kingdom would by no means necessarily conflict with the strategic-airpower theory, for the island would pay its way as an advanced airbase. But a foothold on the continent would not advance our strategic air bases appreciably; and if the British Isles could not be kept secure without a land front in Europe, we could also dispense with the latter as long as we had the B-36. One might therefore say that the B-36 program, in so far as it represents the *major* offensive program of the United States Air Force, runs counter in its implications to the Atlantic Pact.

We have here some basic conflicts between various officially promoted strategic views on the one hand, and, on the other, between one of those views, perhaps the dominant one, and our whole alliance policy. Far from approaching a resolution of those conflicts, we are permitting the issues to be completely obscured by a violent interservice controversy on marginal issues. The issue which matters is not the B-36 versus the large aircraft carrier, but rather the conception which the B-36 represents versus our entire alliance policy.

These bitter interservice quarrels, which are paraded before the world, oblige us to reconsider still another axiom which has now become sacrosanct. The yearning for monolithic structures has led us to exalt the ideal of "unification" for the armed services.

There can be no question, in theory, at least, that the principle of unification is wholly commendable. There is no reason why we should have as many basic strategies as we have services, *except* that our military leaders tend always to think of the functions of their own services in their approaches to



"Now the trouble is we'll need a B-36 to deliver it."

over-all strategy. As long as they exhibit this narrowness, there is no point in permitting any combination of two services to dominate and veto the planning of the third.

Moreover, the strategic problems posed by the atomic bomb, and by chemical and bacterial weapons as well, are so vast, and the answers so far from being known, that it is imperative for the time being to retain a very large measure of elasticity in our efforts to solve those problems. Such elasticity unquestionably involves waste, and in the event of war we would have to pay dearly for it, but the penalty would be as nothing compared to what we would have to pay if we adopted a monolithic scheme that proved to be basically in error.

There is another important consideration about the atomic bomb, perhaps the most important. That is, what does the prospective enemy think about it? The fact that the Russians produced their first atomic bomb sooner than they were expected to proves one thing: The Russians were avidly eager to have the bomb and were willing to go to extreme lengths to get it. But it proves almost nothing else. It does not prove that they have unbounded confidence in its offensive potentialities. They may have had, for instance, only an unbounded desire to keep us from becoming trigger-happy with ours.

The Russians in the Second World War made no secret of their disdain for strategic bombing. Almost all the Soviet lessons and legends of victory in the great "Fatherland War" involved the operations of land forces. In Russia, there is no articulate organization devoted to the theory of victory through airpower. Stalin himself has declared that the machine age makes Clausewitz obsolete, but he was not necessarily thinking of jet engines or atomic bombs. An article in a Russian military journal asserted recently that the two chief lessons of the Second World War were "the importance of accurate small-arms fire and of inurement to forced marches." This is an extreme example, but such an article could have been published only in Russia. If we were to pay less attention to strategic bombing and more to land forces in Europe, there is no reason to think the Russians would view us with less respect.—BERNARD BRODIE

Who Was General Douhet?

The theory of "victory through air power," like so many other radical concepts, is a case of contested paternity. Since 1919, every major power has had its Billy Mitchell. Recently, however, an American admiral decided in favor of the Italian claimant. "Must the Italian Douhet continue as our prophet because certain zealots grasped his false doctrine many years ago?" asked Rear Admiral Ralph A. Ofstie. The distinction of having fathered the theory of air supremacy seems to belong to Douhet.

In 1920, Giulio Douhet, a retired colonel, was publishing, at his own expense, a fiery little magazine called *Il Dovere*, or *The Duty*, devoted to two crusades—putting up a monument to an unknown soldier, and pressing the revolutionary advantages of airpower. Almost no one remembers that Douhet started the vogue for the unknown soldier; he often said he was "the unknown father of the unknown soldier." His other obsession had a stormier career.

Douhet became interested in air power early in 1908 while he was on the Italian General Staff, after a brilliant career as an artillery officer. In 1913, he was placed in command of the first aeronautical battalion in the army. Before long, he began flooding the War Ministry with proposals for new and better utilization of aircraft, but these were invariably turned down as premature. He submitted plans for a three-engined bomber, which his superiors decided was "technically unsound and of no military value."

Perhaps because he was so unmanageable, Douhet was not given a command in the Italian Air Force during the First World War. This infuriated him so that he tried to deal directly with the Cabinet. As a result, he was tried for insubordination, put in jail

for a year, and put on the inactive list after he had completed his sentence. Later, when the defeat at Caporetto proved the validity of some of Douhet's ideas, he was recalled to the army as head of the Central Bureau of Aviation. In 1920 a court martial reversed his previous conviction, and he was appointed to a high position in the General Aeronautical Commission. A few months later in the same year, he left the army, feeling that his ideas still weren't making any headway, and began publishing *Il Dovere*. In 1921 he received the rank of general on the inactive list. The Fascists honored him as a pioneer, but didn't ask his advice or services. He died in 1930.

Since Douhet never had an air command, he was never troubled by the practical problems which confronted his fellow air enthusiasts in other countries, like Lord Trenchard in Britain or Mitchell here. Consequently, he was able to develop his ideas more thoroughly and consistently. In *The Command of the Air*, published in 1921, he put forth a theory of total war, conquest of the air, and strategic bombing, based not on current aircraft but on later models. A later compilation of his articles presents a concept not much different from that of the atomic bomb as absolute weapon.

Some of Douhet's ideas are still hotly contested in Washington. The only possible offensive, he said, is the air offensive. The functions of an army and navy are purely defensive, and their strength must be kept at a minimum, while the strength of the air force is progressively increased. To protect the new service from the two older branches, Douhet foresaw the necessity for a single national-defense ministry, which would, he was sure, inevitably favor the air force at the expense of the other two.

A New Key for 'The Voice'

An observer maintains that the United States must sharpen its propaganda strategy to hit the opponent where it hurts



When George V. Allen, then Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, went before a House subcommittee last August to request another \$12,830,000 for the State Department's international information services, a Congressman told him he would have to do "some real talking."

Allen did. "Until a few years ago," he said, "governments normally conducted their foreign relations exclusively with other governments. . . . In the present world situation, where the motives and objectives of the United States are so often misrepresented and misunderstood, we have been forced to take our story directly to foreign people, many of whom live under régimes hostile to our country and what it stands for."

Congress came through with a supplemental \$11,500,000, although only seven months before the State Department had asked for the unprecedented sum of thirty-six million for its international information program. To justify both the original appropriation and the additional one, Allen, an ex-newspaperman and ex-teacher, described how the public-affairs office had managed to dispel Australian misgivings about our policy in Indonesia; how it had helped the Indian national assembly draft a new constitution; how it tells an estimated twenty-five million foreigners "what Americans are like"; and, most important of all, how it is keeping up the courage of "all the peoples of eastern Europe who hope some day to recover their liberties."

Hardly anybody questions the importance of the propaganda program—even in Congress, which once regard-

ed the spread of information abroad as an international boon-doggle. The State Department has assigned thirteen per cent of its funds and more than twenty per cent of its personnel to the growing public-affairs section. Nevertheless, there appears to be an underlying inadequacy in the entire U. S. information effort. It is not the fault of the State Department's internal organization. Nor can it, in fact, be attributed to any villains. The difficulty lies rather in the very article our information staff is trying to "sell"; the voice of democracy, by its nature, cannot easily reach the ears of people deafened by the assertive claims of totalitarianism.

The trouble with our current propaganda campaign is that, in spite of its obviously commendable intentions, it does not seem to be moving toward a distinct and tangible goal. The deficiency is in concrete ideological content, either in the long-run strategic battles or in the day-to-day tactical tangles with Radio Moscow.

Unable to pursue a straight and consistent path, our propaganda cannot help being negative or at the mercy of events. One day, it may baldly play up the story of Madame Kasenkina's pathetic escape from Soviet captivity—an effective but at best a tactical move within the grand strategic design, especially since the Kasenkina story is fourteen months old. The next day, up against the broad strategic theme provided by the mass exodus of political and intellectual refugees from behind the Iron Curtain, it is likely to be hesitant and timid, giving the subject a factual minimum of coverage.

A democracy may—and, of course, should—place its own noble mute on its instruments of propaganda. It cer-

tainly should avoid making the shrill and blatant noises of totalitarian brass sections. But first of all it needs a lot of practice in using the mute, and the audacity to put it aside when penetrating notes are called for.

Propaganda is a type of warfare in which brainpower takes the place of airpower or seapower. Its design is the classic one of war as defined by Clausewitz: "an act . . . intended to impose one's will upon an opponent." Like all other types of war, it requires the utmost use of intellectual force and the utmost exertion of ideological powers; it can never be an isolated act; it does not consist of a single instantaneous blow; its results are never absolute; its aim is to disarm the enemy.

If it is true that we are out to defeat the U.S.S.R. in a cold war, and if it is equally true that our propaganda is supposed to further our diplomatic aspirations, then that propaganda should face realities in its policy, themes, and techniques.

The realistic approach would be openly and frankly to identify the opponent as the U.S.S.R., and then to develop a strategy of propaganda that would cause material embarrassment to the Soviet government; cause ideological embarrassment to the Soviet leadership; undermine faith in that leadership; and alienate the Kremlin's adherents inside and outside the Russian orbit.

Propaganda cannot create conflicts or issues, but one of its basic tasks is to detect and exploit *existing* issues. Good propaganda must plug itself into the vacant sockets of live conflicts in the opponent's camp, and gain power for its own purposes from the current that such conflicts usually generate.

The Stalin-Tito rift provides a sin-

gular opportunity for the practical demonstration of this principle. American propaganda, however, plays the conflict fairly straight—almost as an academic dispute that deserves only scant and blasé comment from an aloof observer. Mere reportage of the intra-Cominform conflict is not enough. The Stalin-Tito rift can be understood only against the background of the realities of the Cominform, and of the aspirations of Bolshevik imperialism.

The Voice of America should become, by virtue of both the authenticity of its facts and the soundness of its interpretations, the most authoritative source of information on the Stalin-Tito rift. The archives of our intelligence services should be opened to our propagandists, and our best political analysts should be enlisted to work on the program.

This unique coverage would attract the whole radio-listening world to the Voice of America. This theme could blanket all other issues, if it were broadcast across the globe on a scale second to none, from programs in English to programs in Korean.

A great opportunity was missed in 1948 during the one-hundredth anniversary of the *Communist Manifesto*'s publication.

Marx, the hero of the celebration, was a European par excellence, a political and economic philosopher of the evolutionary West and not of the anarchical East. His last influence has been forcefully stated by Isaiah Berlin, in words the philosophers of the Voice of America ought to read with interest.

"Not only the conflicting classes and their leaders in every country," Berlin wrote in his handy little classic, *Karl Marx*, "but historians and sociologists, psychologists and political scientists, critics and creative artists, so far as they try to analyze the changing quality of the life of their society, owe the form of their ideas in part to the work of Karl Marx. . . . It set out to refute the proposition that ideas govern the course of history, but the very extent of its own influence on human affairs has weakened the force of its thesis. For in altering the hitherto prevailing view of the relation of the individual to his environment and to his fellows, it has palpably altered that relation itself; and in consequence remains the most powerful among the intellectual forces which

are today permanently transforming the ways in which men think and act."

The anniversary of the *Manifesto* should have been observed in this spirit, and not in the vituperative, unscientific manner western propagandists, including those of Socialist Britain, treated it. Minds brought up to believe that Marxism is infallible can only be expected to bristle when their convictions are simply abused and dismissed.

The centennial should have been seized upon by our propagandists for a comprehensive discussion of the strange evolution of Marxism that is revealed in Marx's own writings. The Russians, in particular, would have been susceptible to a quasi-esoteric political discussion involving some adroit dialectical maneuvering.

The debate should have been conducted from the American end by a world-renowned scholar dexterous enough to show that our opponents are not even consistent in defining their professed beliefs. His task would have been to show that Marx himself drifted off on "deviations" which no pseudo-

scientist of the Moscow Institute named after him could satisfactorily explain. This would not have been too difficult a task. Marx's writings abound in useful examples.

Between the blazing exclamation of the preamble, ("A specter is haunting Europe—the specter of Communism."), and the powerful lyricism of the conclusion ("The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win."), the *Manifesto* contains much to cite against Soviet-Russian claims and abuses.


We could have asked: How do you scholars of the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute of Moscow reconcile the Marxian statement that "The Communists disdain to conceal their views and aims," with the Principle of Conspiracy advanced in the official Political Dictionary of the U.S.S.R.?

And what do you, Premier Stalin, say to this Marxian maxim? "Political power, properly so called, is merely the organized power of one class for oppressing another."

And do you, we should have asked, abide by this Marxian injunction? "In place of the old bourgeois society, with its classes and class antagonisms, we shall have an association in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all."

But beyond the exuberant text of the *Manifesto* itself, the various prefaces for its subsequent editions provide arguments that might implant doubts in the minds of people throughout Bolshevik society.

From 1872 on, each preface to subsequent editions revealed a progressive tendency on the part of Marx and Engels to retreat from those very premises which today form the most



violent themes of Bolshevik propaganda.

In the 1872 preface to the German edition, the two wrote: "The practical application of the principles will depend, as the *Manifesto* itself states, everywhere and at all times, on the historical conditions for the time being existing, and, for that reason, *no special stress is laid on the revolutionary measures proposed at the end of Section II.*" That passage would, in many respects, be very differently worded today.

Through such attacks we might start demolishing with Marx's own words the idol the Bolsheviks have erected. We might even succeed in frightening the superstitious Communist masses, whose neophyte faith is maintained through uncritical dependence on the dogma of Marxist infallibility.

Such a debate on Marx might have received quite a lot of surreptitious attention in Russia. Some Russians would, for the first time, have understood fully both the contents and intents, as well as the language, of American propaganda, which now resounds so metallically as it hammers away at synthetic-sounding themes.

As our offensive went on, an all-out campaign could be mounted against some of the basic tenets and themes of Soviet propaganda. The two most important anti-American motifs of Soviet propaganda are: the theme of capitalist encirclement, pillorying the "warmongers and imperialists of the west," allegedly bent on the destruction of Russia, always represented as a peaceful and peace-loving popular democracy; and second, the Wall Street theme, pinpointing the warmongers' headquarters by singling out American capitalism and capitalists.

The Soviet idea that the capitalists were closing in on Russia was proven monumentally wrong during the Second World War, when the western world allied itself with the Bolsheviks, instead of joining Hitler to hasten the destruction of the Soviet state. Is there a better argument for the demolition of this theme than the respective records of the West and the East in their dealings with Nazism? Before June, 1941, the nominally-neutral Soviet government helped Nazi auxiliary cruisers to evade the British blockade, and reach the open sea through the Denmark Straits, after which they raided Allied convoys with impunity. This act can be contrasted to the heroism of the Allied merchant seamen and naval personnel on the Murmansk route who delivered the tools which helped the U.S.S.R. to finish the job. There are memorable dates in the calendar of this betrayal and this heroism—dates which could be well utilized by our propaganda to demolish Theme Number One.

The second major theme could be easily proven fallacious in any number of ways. We could get off to a good

start by recounting Andrei Gromyko's intimate contacts with American financiers and industrialists, and his famous remark, "The only friends we have left in the United States are American big business," which was made to an important Wall Streeter during a luncheon given Gromyko by the New York Chamber of Commerce.

We could go on from there to tell about the millions of dollars' worth of Moscow gold faithfully and efficiently handled by the Chase National Bank, traditionally the Kremlin's fiscal agent in the United States; of Amtorg's cordial relations with the National Association of Manufacturers; and of the atmosphere of friendship and business co-operation prevailing within the publicity-shy American-Russian Chamber of Commerce, most of whose members usually vote straight Republican.

We could make a point of the fact that, far from plotting the overthrow of the Soviet system, Wall Street is actually doing its best to maintain friendly day-to-day relations between the United States and the U.S.S.R. in the economic field. Nor has the Soviet government failed to take advantage of this co-operation. It is not as spectacular as the Waldorf-Astoria meeting of "peacemongers," but far more useful to genuine Soviet aims.

The main point is that our propaganda should be raised to an ideological level above the pedestrianism of straight reportage, and, while by no means abandoning a "Strategy of Truth," which has been one of the sources of strength in our propaganda effort, we must develop a "Strategy of Propaganda Action."

If, in the process, we find ourselves walking with our feet firmly on the ground and our heads just as firmly in the clouds, this should not alarm us. This campaign will be a job for a virtuoso who combines ingenuity, imagination, and a detailed understanding of our opponents. Those who control America's voices abroad must seek a formula—easy to compound, and producing a brew that contains all the elements of good propaganda and of our national psychology. Such a formula, all-inclusive and satisfactory to everybody, may be found in an old French recipe for coffee: "Black as the devil, hot as hell, pure as an angel, sweet as love."

—LADISLAS FARAGO



Washington Dispatch: 1952

A nightmarish fantasy of a new Soviet strategy that could come close to wrecking the United States



It is now three years since the first atomic explosion in Soviet Russia stunned an apprehensive, war-weary world. Today, reeling under the economic disaster of 1952, Americans recognize the explosion near Omsk as a turning point for the United States and for the world. It punctuated a chapter of American policy remarkable for its self-satisfied bumbling. It set off a chain reaction of results and causes that completely altered the balance of power on our planet.

In the fall of 1949, the United States seemed to most Americans and many Europeans the unchallenged leader of world democracy, immeasurably rich in productive power and per-capita wealth. Profits after taxes were over twenty billion dollars a year. More than sixty million Americans were employed at wages that seemed fantastic elsewhere in the world; their living standards and rights were guarded by trade unions, most of whose leaders were at once able and reasonable. America's military potential seemed enormous.

Now, in the fall of 1952, the picture is utterly and tragically changed. The United States has lost, perhaps irretrievably, its moral and economic pre-eminence. The fabric of western unity, which three years ago appeared to be emerging as a handsome tapestry of peace and plenty, hangs in shreds. The United States is convulsed by the worst economic crisis in its history.

How did this come about? Some historians attribute the collapse of the United States to Stalin's sensational diplomacy in the end of 1949, but they forgot that all the Soviet leader really did was belatedly to correct mistakes he had been making since 1945 or

earlier. Others maintain that the real causes lay in our muscle-bound economy and in the confused thinking of our leaders in the years immediately after the war.

Stalin's death last month, and the subsequent disorders in the Soviet Union—which led several Soviet statesmen to flee to America and make voluminous depositions—have given us our first opportunity to examine critically the crucial events of the past two years, and determine whether Stalin's genius or American stupidity is more responsible for the present crisis.

According to documents brought to the United States last year, Stalin returned from his summer home in Sochi in September, 1949, called together the members of the *Politburo*, and addressed them as follows:

"Comrades, let us take stock of our position five years after the end of the great Fatherland War.

"Germany's surrender in 1945 left the Soviet Union in virtual control of the continent of Europe. Our armies had gone as far as the Elbe and the Alps. Farther west, France, England, and Italy were bankrupt, hopeless, and harassed by large and growing Communist Parties. Germany was in chaos. Throughout the continent, millions of people, sick of war, looked to the Soviet Union and to Communism for leadership and support. We had every reason to expect that a few months would bring the collapse of capitalism in Europe and the accession to power of Communist Popular Front governments as far as the Atlantic. In Asia and Africa tumultuous popular movements against imperialism had made a return to the *status quo ante* virtually impossible. Only in the Western Hemisphere, specifically in the United States,

was capitalism vigorous enough to survive the tremendous world crisis brought on by the Second World War.


"Comrades, what happened then? Our Soviet soldiers were such poor ambassadors of Communism that within a few short weeks the people of eastern Europe had become irrevocably hostile, and Communist governments could keep themselves in power only by taking vigorous administrative measures with the support of the Soviet Army. Torn by need at home, we exacted from the countries of eastern and central Europe reparations so heavy that we crippled their economies and aroused the indignation even of our comrades in Yugoslavia and Poland.

"Still we persisted. Certain that economic crisis would soon grip the United States, we pushed our position to the utmost, thus arousing wide circles of the population of the United States to the 'danger of Communism'; making possible the passage through a traditionally isolationist legislature of the Marshall Plan, the Atlantic Pact, and military aid to Europe; and driving the western capitalist nations to far-reaching co-operation and even international planning. These measures in turn provided the artificial stimuli which have kept U. S. capitalism alive and vigorous, and made an apparent mockery of our theories.

"This is the situation, Comrades. We must face it honestly. We must re-examine the economic theories of such people as Comrade Varga, and take stock of our military and our ideological armaments."

What Stalin proceeded to say—his analysis of the dilemma of peace or war—was not known in the western world until last week, when Lazar Kaganovich, former Soviet leader, now a political refugee in this country, released





the full minutes of that historic Politburo meeting. Stalin said:

"We now have our own atomic bomb. Before long, we will have guided missiles capable of delivering the bomb to the continental United States. But the Americans have similar or better weapons, and war would wreck the economy of both countries. Besides this, a war would unify the American people, stimulate still greater production, and stiffen the patriotism of the British, French, and others, thereby rendering possible a vigorous resistance against the Soviet armies. No, Comrades. We must avoid war. We require a bloodless victory, and that we can achieve by looking to our great theoretical heritage, to the laws of capitalist society discovered by Marx and elaborated by Lenin.

"If, during recent years, capitalist nations of the West have engaged in planning, have co-operated with one another instead of competing, it has been because an outside threat has a unifying influence. We have forced the organization of the western world into something resembling a planned capitalist society. We have, in effect, created the very thing we have always declared could never exist. As long as we continue thus, not only will there be no crisis in the West, there will be continued armament and rearmament; Germany, Italy, and then Japan will be turned into arsenals and training grounds for armies of the western world which we may be unable to match in size or equipment. Eventually we will find ourselves involved in a war we cannot win."

Stalin then outlined the new policy which was to have such immediate and far-reaching results.

"Comrades, what can we do? We can cease to be a military and ideolog-

ical threat to the western world. We can do this, Comrades, by making an offer of a settlement so generous, so convincing, so overwhelming, that its acceptance will be mandatory for the governments of the United States and western Europe. Robbed thus of the stimuli of armament production, capitalism will decay normally; strife and dissension will rock the western world, leaving us stronger, and well able to assume control gradually throughout the world.

"We have already laid the foundation for such a maneuver. We have sponsored and supported People's Peace Movements throughout the countries of the world. We have, in the United Nations and elsewhere, adopted a most intransigent attitude on a number of relatively unimportant points. We have been stubborn to the point of infuriating our antagonists. Thus we have set up a number of forward defenses which we can now abandon without any real loss. More important, we have produced an atomic bomb, thereby breaking the monopoly on which so many Americans were counting for security.

"Before embarking on this new turn of our policy, we must do several things in order to ensure success. In the first place we must dramatize our bomb by staging the most effective atomic demonstration ever seen. In the second place we must punish those people who are most responsible for having strengthened the western will to resist."

Having made this remarkable speech, the aging Soviet leader settled down in his chair, as was his custom, and threw the meeting open to debate. His report was discussed for three days, with a vigor that frequently bordered on violence. Molotov, feeling that he had al-

ready been squeezed out of some of his authority by Malenkov, was the most unruly. It may have been clear to him, as it now is to us, that Stalin had decided to use him as a scapegoat for his own previous mistakes in foreign policy. In the end the *Politburo* approved Stalin's plan and proceeded at once to put it into effect.

Few readers need to be reminded that the atomic bomb demonstration in Kazakhstan in March, 1950, combined the best scientific work done by Kapitza and other German specialists taken to the U.S.S.R. in 1945 with the theatrical showmanship of Stanislavski and the dythyrambic perfection of the Moscow *corps de ballet*. Four bombs exploded, two of them in guided missiles. Seven hundred foreign correspondents, generals, and statesmen returned to their countries in April, shaken by the power of the Soviet Union's atomic weapons and the effectiveness of their missiles. Their reports were still sizzling on the front pages of the world's press when Stalin arrived, literally hat in hand, a smile on his wrinkled face, at the National Airport in Washington. President Truman had no alternative but to receive him, for he had stated several times that he would be delighted to talk to Mr. Stalin—in Washington.

Stalin had little trouble in enlisting the co-operation of the American radio and television networks to transmit his remarks, particularly since he had gone to the trouble of learning enough English to be easily understood. Stalin's smile won over television audiences. His proposals were generous in the extreme. His plan for complete disarmament and his guarantees of controls were all that anyone could have wished. His offers of plebiscites in eastern Europe under United Nations

supervision, his renunciation of the veto in the Security Council, and, finally, his proposal to permit western churches to send missions and missionaries to the U.S.S.R., coupled with a promise to re-establish real religious freedom, won over all categories of skeptics.

While Stalin rested near Warm Springs, Georgia, the nation was swept by the greatest debate in history. Huge town meetings were organized. Congressional and business leaders orated and argued. The Hearst-McCormick press, at first suspicious, came out in support of the proposals, as did most of the left-of-center publications. Many of the original New Dealers in the Administration and in labor thought it was time to go back to the prewar program of "Save America First." The last objections collapsed when Molotov and Vishinsky were tried in Moscow for warmongering, and publicly executed, after a complete confession including detailed statements of how their major utterances, particularly at the U.N., brought on such Congressional measures as the ERP and the Atlantic Pact. By May 1, the last resistance had been smothered under the overwhelming pressure of public opinion, both in the United States and in the countries of western Europe. The Stalin Proposals formed the basis for the Universal Treaty of Washington, signed May 2.

Then the trouble started. Before the U.N. had organized commissions to proceed on inspection tours to the Urals and Siberia, before the election-control teams had bought their tickets to Bucharest and Budapest to observe the pre-plebiscite campaigns, before Stalin had time to get out of his six-jet bomber at the Tushino Airport in Moscow, things happened in the United States.

We had at the time just under two million in the armed forces. Another two and a half to three million men and women were at work in the manufacture of arms. Under the budget of 1949-1950, some fifteen billion dollars had been appropriated for the maintenance of the nation's defenses and for research in new weapons.

Although the Universal Treaty provided for complete disarmament during the course of one year, the reaction in the U.S. economy was immediate.

Overnight the nation was flooded with labor released from the Army and defense industries.

America was completely unprepared for real peace, and lacked leadership in every field. The whole country was swept by a pathological urge to return to "normalcy"—a catch phrase that was invoked by many groups which meant utterly different things by it. Congress went isolationist immediately. Huge blocs in both houses bellowed indignantly that there was now no earthly reason why the United States should continue to spend billions for the support of dubious monarchies and socialist experiments in Europe. Congress halted ERP abruptly. That caused the cancellation of several billion dollars in orders for manufactured goods and agricultural surpluses. A fairly large group of leaders, headed by Paul Hoffman and Walter Reuther, ably supported by Lewis Douglas and W. Averell Harriman, saw disaster ahead.

They organized themselves into the "Committee to Defend America by Helping the World," and fought desperately for immediate reconsideration of both the domestic and foreign development programs. They were overwhelmed by shrill cries of "normalcy." One of the strange things that happened was that Henry Wallace disappeared, as if there were no further use for him. He gave one final interview to a New York paper called *The Daily Compass*, and nothing more was heard of him.

The harassed Administration, foreseeing catastrophe, hastily sketched out a super-WPA to try to stem the rising unemployment and put the nation's immense surpluses to some use. The N.A.M. fell under the control of its most isolationist elements, and protested Federal interference with private industrial production and research. The American Medical Association outdid itself in a fight against government participation in the construction of hospitals, clinics, and health centers. Several military groups, the most noteworthy of which was the so-called Colonels' Club, did their utmost to arouse public concern with the threatening attitudes of both Mexico and Canada, and stressed the necessity of maintaining large military establishments to ensure protection for ourselves and our children against the aggressive intentions of our neighbors.

In short, confusion reigned. Wall Street foundered, and unemployment rose dizzily—ten million on June 1, fifteen million a month later, and nearly twenty-five million by fall of 1950.

Under all the pressures many progressive and statesmanlike labor leaders—men like David Dubinsky, George Baldanzi, and Walter Reuther—lost control of their unions. Veterans of the forces and workers from military industries were specifically prevented by John L. Lewis and others from taking jobs in the country's few operative factories. The veterans organized themselves and civil war threatened. Falling immediately into the arms of the "Whiteshirt" movement, they staged armed insurrections in Birmingham and Detroit, which were suppressed only with the greatest difficulty by the National Guard.

In western Europe, civil war became an immediate reality. The collapse of the ERP left France, Britain, and Italy bankrupt and helpless. The French Communists had sense enough, or their bosses in Moscow did, to wait for de Gaulle to move first. As soon as this happened, they raised loud antifascist cries and struck. Within two months they controlled every important city in France. In August, Italy gave up, and the smaller countries of Scandi-

TRUMAN REVEALS RED A-BLAST



MRS. HALLIE JETTON, a housewife of Washington, D. C.: "I don't think the Russians should have the bomb. They don't need it and they won't know how to use it, except against us."

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navia and the Lowlands, completely outflanked, lacking markets and support, both moral and economic, came tumbling after. Britain, as usual, compromised and temporized, but by the end of 1951 the continent of Europe was organized into the Popular Democratic Federation of People's Republics, without serious bloodshed anywhere, except in industrial Germany and rural France.

There were difficulties, of course. During all of 1951, guerrilla warfare continued. Tens of thousands starved. But Moscow sent its ablest economists and engineers to help the Dutch, the French, and the Italians integrate their economies into the new world, and by the spring of 1952 much progress had been made. Industrial production was approaching 1948 levels, though living standards were down some twenty per cent. The owning classes had, of course, been expropriated, and, in many cases, locked up in labor camps. Their confiscated wealth put new government trusts on their feet. Europe carried on a brisk trade with the Soviet Union, which put Ruhr machines, Belgian textiles, French aluminum, and even Dutch bulbs to good use. They sent back in return cotton, wheat, fodder, manganese, and tobacco. Of course, Moscow fixed the prices in these transactions, on the implicit basis that living standards in Europe would not be permitted to increase substantially until Soviet standards overtook and surpassed them.

Freedom of the press, freedom of movement, and freedom of political opposition virtually disappeared. But the Russians adhered to their agreements scrupulously. The United Nations Atomic Control Commission found no closed doors in the Soviet Union or anywhere else. Plebiscites in eastern Europe at first threw out Communist governments, but other "Popular Front" parties, with new and beguiling names, had little trouble in worming their way back into power before very long.

Of course the various commissions and control teams wandering through the Soviet world ran into many unpleasant things—concentration camps, millions of starving prisoners, evidences of genocide in the cases of the Balts and other minorities. But with America on the verge of civil war, and a good

TRUMAN REVEALS RED A-BLAST



A. A. ARUTIUNIAN, Soviet delegate to the U. N.: "I have heard this news from the President for the first time."

working majority of Communist or pro-Communist countries in both the Security Council and the General Assembly, Moscow was not seriously embarrassed.

There was "peace on earth," as the Popular Front press was never tired of pointing out. It was a Pax Sovietica, as it were—constantly punctuated by the half-stifled cries of millions of unhappy, hopeless human beings. Even those few who made their way to America found themselves hungry, hounded by the trade unions if they attempted to get jobs, and by immigration officials in any case.

The death of Stalin last month and the sharp conflicts now breaking out in many parts of the Soviet Union provide a last chance for the United States to regain moral leadership, and simultaneously to pull itself out of the present crisis, in which millions starve while business leaders speak anxiously of waiting three more years until surpluses are exhausted.

Now Communism is beginning to reap the whirlwind it has sown. Soviet leaders are fighting among themselves. In Europe millions, long restive under Stalin's peace-without-freedom, are stirring. The intricate structure of the Federation of People's Republics seems to have been seriously weakened, not by outside attack, to which it remains as invulnerable as we were in the late

1940's, but by corrosive forces within itself. What now?

The Colonels' Club speaks of return to sound policies of preparedness, forgetting that the world's peoples, sick as they are of Stalinist tyranny, do not desire to revive armed, sovereign states, each with its tariff barrier, and its crushingly expensive machinery for military action.

We must not repeat the appalling error of 1948-1949.

We must plan for peace, not war. We failed then, and went down in a national catastrophe that has given us some humility and not a little bitter wisdom. Today we must not fail, or the world's millions will turn elsewhere for leadership. We must offer Europe and Asia something more than arms and dollars—namely a revived concept and an active program of democracy, not necessarily patterned after the American model.

We must begin by going back to work. We must then proceed to share our wealth and our great productive capacity with our brother men, not so much with an eye to profits, as in the past, but with our sights set on a prosperous, peaceful world. It is not the servicing of our loans that matters, but the fabric of world co-operation. Potentially, in spite of our recent disaster, we have everything required to lead the world in this direction.

The men who founded the Committee to Defend America by Helping the World are again finding their voices, and this time they are finding a wide response. Our first test will be the Presidential elections next month. Four months ago there was barely a doubt that Colonel Robert R. McCormick, at the head of the new American National Party, would sweep the country. Today there is much more than a doubt; there is an even chance that he will be defeated. Our second test—if we meet the first one successfully—will be the greatest of all: the challenge to put our shoulders to the heavy wheel of world recovery—in humility, patience, and fortitude—knowing that the peoples of the world, sickened by centuries of wars, will no longer tolerate any policy short of peace and plenty. No matter what the National Party may say, there is no isolationist "normalcy" that we can return to. This is our last chance—let us take it.

—JOHN SCOTT

Back from the War



After four or more years in Russian prison camps, the captured soldiers of Austria return to Vienna



Photos by Ernst Haas-Magnum

Their Bomb and Ours

*A European reaction to Russia's first atomic explosion:
Our problem is unchanged but it must be solved faster*



The European reaction to President Truman's announcement that the Russians have the atomic bomb was calmer than might have been expected. For a good many people, it took the form of a query: How will this development affect the policy of the United States? Europeans are perfectly aware that their situation is loaded with dynamite—or U-235. The Russian frontier is hard upon them, and they cannot fail to feel the pressure of the massive and mysterious force to the east. But Europe had gone through its moment of acute panic somewhat earlier in the game; now it has begun to look at the danger more analytically.

Three years ago, in mid-1946, the scales were tipped heavily in Russia's favor. The American Army had been optimistically demobilized at home and abroad, while the Russians maintained theirs at wartime strength. All of the western European governments, except Great Britain's, were being nibbled at by Communist politicians, whose influence extended into the highest circles. Why didn't Russia take greater advantage of these circumstances? There must have been a definite reason, and many Europeans now have an idea what that reason was.

Whatever political parallels may be drawn between the Nazi and Communist forms of government, the Russian position today is very different from the German position in 1939. At that time, the Germans, and Hitler in particular, believed that they had reached the peak of their arms production, and that further delay would work against them in favor of the democracies. It was a case of now or never. In 1949,

however, the Russians think that time is on their side.

The Soviet Union learned certain lessons from the last war. It learned that German war production, plus that of the conquered countries of continental Europe, was no match for the arms output of the Allies. In other words, the Russians have come to the conclusion, quite in line with their general philosophy, that nowadays God is on the side not of the big battalions but of the big factories. And, as far as factories go, they have a pretty good idea how far the U.S.S.R. lags behind the United States.

Let us look at a concrete example: steel. Russia produces over twenty-two million tons a year, America about ninety million. (Similar proportions hold for most other key industries.) If the Russians should add the steel production of western Europe to their own, they still would be far from equaling American output. They figure, however, that they have the manpower and the raw materials to catch up eventually. They have set themselves a goal of sixty million tons of steel a year, which they apparently consider a security level, and Stalin said in 1946 that it would take at least

three more five-year plans, or, let us say, twenty years, to attain it.

Moreover, as good Marxists, the Russians believe that the capitalist world is doomed to progressive decay. Twenty years from now, they must reason, American or Anglo-American hegemony will be a softer nut to crack than it is now.

Then, there is the character of Stalin. Few westerners have seen anything of him, but he has been prominent in the government since 1922, and the eleventh volume of his collected works recently came off the Soviet presses. His future policy may perhaps be pieced together from his old ones, with the aid of his writings. They show him to be a realist, given neither to bluff nor to long chances. Throughout his career, he has never taken unnecessary risks; he has always chosen to strike when he was in the strongest position with respect to his enemy. We can hardly imagine that, in his old age, he has suddenly become reckless. Stalin quite obviously does not consider the internal political structure of Russia perfect. He is still intent upon perfecting it, for it is his own creation, and besides, he has the religious conviction that he is Lenin's successor. We have no reason to believe that, like Mussolini or



Hitler, he will gamble away his laborious construction.

On the basis of these considerations, it does not seem that possession of the atomic bomb will make for any immediate change in Stalin's plans. The only difference is that, with a retaliatory weapon in hand, Stalin can now feel safer; he need no longer fear seeing his country and his dream of worldwide Communism go up in atomic smoke.

In the last two prewar five-year plans there were psychological precedents for the present situation of the Soviet Union. In the period after the First World War, Russia's foreign policy was determined by the fear that its neighbors would form a coalition against the Socialist experiment. (I use the word Socialist because, in spite of what his enemies may say, Stalin has always maintained that Russia is still in a Socialist, and not a Communist, stage.) The spearhead of the coalition was thought to be Germany. Stalin's domestic opponents, who were equally aware of the menace, thought that it could be averted by finessing (the Locarno agreements, the Ribbentrop-Molotov accord, and the fomentation of Communist activity within Germany). Stalin did not entirely reject this policy, but, more realistically, he held that industrial production was Russia's chief weakness, and that it must be raised at least to the German level. To accomplish this, he imposed upon the Russians sacrifices such as only slaves had ever been compelled to accept before. This explains the atmosphere of almost hysterical tension in which the Russians lived during the two successive five-year plans before the war. In those days Russia was not in the limelight to the extent that it is now, and the underlying motives for its be-

havior were not obvious, except to a few experts.

It is likely that Russia has been going through the same tense process during the recent period of hectic research on the atomic bomb, and now perhaps Stalin can afford to relax a little. However, he has not yet achieved the final aim of his preparations. During the previous build-up period Stalin correctly foresaw that Germany was the enemy, and equality with German production was his goal. Today, in anticipation of war with the United States, he has set his sights still higher, in the atomic and all other industrial fields, and of course he still has a long way to go. There is no reason, then, to believe that Russian policy will deviate from the line it has consistently followed since 1945. Russia will seek to expand wherever there is a vacuum, and will do so by all means short of war, but not risk war itself.


The "atomic policy" of the United States is the cause of much doubt and apprehension in Europe. No one really knows what attitude American military leaders have toward Europe. There are those who go so far as to wonder whether there is any positive American strategy at all, or whether there are not just a number of conflicting opinions, like so many straws in the wind. All Europe knows is what America says, and it is hard to separate hard facts from cold-war propaganda. Americans must not forget that, unlike themselves, Europeans have experienced war, as well as the ensuing occupation and liberation, on their own soil.

Now most Europeans have the impression that the majority of Americans count on the atomic bomb to check any Russian invasion of western Europe speedily. Europeans have no

such faith. They witnessed the American bombardment of Germany, and without denying that it softened up German resistance, most people on the continent don't believe that it could have won the war alone. If the German Army had not been bled white, as it was in the Russian campaign, would American bombardment have been sufficient to pave the way for the Allied landing on the continent? The question is an academic one, but Europeans would tend to answer it in the negative. They know that the atomic bomb is many times more powerful than any other bomb, but also that it is not miraculous. Depending upon it to stop a Russian invasion seems a dangerous illusion, and people in Europe see no alternative to a repeat performance of occupation and liberation, including the process of softening up by bombardment.

Some Europeans have been troubled by an equally serious worry. They have seen evidence of an alarming American political tendency, growing out of the "atomic mentality." This tendency is to handle the Russians roughly, because supposedly a few bombs could teach them a quick lesson.

And what exactly do we mean by "atomic mentality?" There is, obviously, a problem of western European defense. Today western Europe's total armed forces are not powerful enough to meet an invasion by the Russian armies stationed in eastern Germany and the satellite countries alone. One may say that the Russians will never launch any such invasion, because it would immediately embroil them in a war with the United States. But the continuously impending danger, and the resultant uncertainty, have a debilitating influence on western Europe's morale, and even on its political structure.



Western Europe can be defended, not country by country, but as an organic whole. It has over 270 million people, and far more equipment, both industrial and intellectual, than Soviet Russia can get together at present. The problem can be resolved, on a collective basis, if America calls upon the best European brains, and gives the defense plans an international character. This does not mean that the American taxpayer must throw his money down a bottomless well. The defense job would be limited to setting up machinery that goes beyond any that exists today, and gradually accelerating its operation. Each of the European countries need only be in a position to spend on joint defense a relatively small part of what it once spent on preparing and waging wars on its neighbors.

So far, there is no great difference of opinion on the two sides of the Atlantic. However, some people in the United States seem to think that there is no point in equipping large European armies, since the defense of the continent is assured by the American Air Force and the atomic bomb. This is what is termed "atomic mentality." While Europeans do not neglect the importance of aviation, they believe that land armies are still necessary to stem the advance of Russian divisions.

If the European point of view is a mistaken one, the United States may waste a lot of money equipping European armies. But if the atomic-bomb strategy turns out to be wrong, western Europe will be overrun by the Russians. Europeans will undergo occupation and military government, and if the Russians are to be dislodged, the "softening-up" process will be long and destructive. "Liberation" will entail further ruin, and then Europe will

again be faced with the problem of rebuilding.

Here, then, is the difference between the American and the European points of view. The Americans can afford to make a mistake, because they would not suffer as much from the consequences. If the Russians were to occupy Europe, the United States would still be in a less vulnerable position than England was in 1940. Europeans, though, are quite sure that, for them, a strategic error would be fatal. This time the moral and material destruction would be such that no number of UNRRA's and Marshall Plans could provide a cure. Unless Americans can see the situation through European eyes, there is no prospect of understanding. The fact that the Russians now possess the atomic bomb, even if the Americans have a long head start, should entail a revision of American strategy, to make for greater collaboration in defense plans. If this happened, Russia's mastery of the atomic-bomb secret might turn out to be a godsend.

Have Americans awakened to the realities of the situation? Europeans fear that they may still be considering two dangerous alternatives: either a showdown with Russia while America still has the larger stockpile of atomic bombs; or a settlement by virtue of which western Europe would be delivered into Russian hands. Europeans fear the first alternative more than the second. They do not believe that today many Americans are isolationist enough to wash their hands of the continent altogether. Europeans worry, rather, about the possibility of a quick showdown, which they are sure would be disastrous for them.

The vast majority of Europeans want nothing but peace. They feel that peace is possible, and look on the

Atlantic Pact as a means to its achievement. They are not blind to the danger of Russia's sheer physical strength, or to the tyranny of the Communist form of government. But only a few madmen believe the situation can be eased by a preventive war. Even if such a war could be carried to a victorious conclusion, it would leave problems in its wake that would defy even American wealth and ingenuity.

Europeans believe, then, that sufficient defenses must be built up on the spot to convince the most hotheaded Russian marshals that invasion would be too risky. If such barriers could be put in Russia's way, there would be a comparatively relaxed atmosphere, in which the advantages of the American way of life could be more freely demonstrated. It would be up to the western world to exhibit the more attractive standard of living. If it failed to, there would be no stemming the Communist tide. If it succeeded, no iron curtain could stop popular sentiment from running in the opposite direction.

The United States sees things about this way in its official pronouncements. Various unofficial indications leave Europe perplexed. The breakdown of the atomic concept of strategy, brought about by Russia's detonation of the bomb, may herald the proper moment for a clarification of ideas. This is more basic than the question of what specific military measures should be taken under the Atlantic Pact. The problems of organization can be solved only if there is agreement on a fundamental policy. Without it, there is little hope of obtaining the wholehearted co-operation of European peoples, which is essential to the pact's lasting efficacy. This co-operation, in turn, depends upon greater unity in Europe, especially in the matter of armaments. —FLAVIUS



To Man's Measure . . .



Mrs. Iva Ikuko Toguri D'Aquino



The Rose and the Tiger

At the trial of "Tokyo Rose" for treason in San Francisco, American justice functioned normally. The trial lasted twelve weeks; Mrs. D'Aquino had the support of energetic counsel; Judge Michael J. Roche held closely to the classic American doctrine of the "overt act"; the jury deliberated for seventy-eight hours and fifteen minutes before bringing in a verdict of guilty—a verdict that can and will be appealed. As long as there had to be a trial at all, this was a fair one.

Mrs. D'Aquino broadcast from Japan, Ezra Pound broadcast from Italy, and the trials of both these Americans had some appearance of being merely the bureaucratic end-products of literal-minded intelligence services. As such, they seemed devoid of moral significance and a large waste of public money, emotion, and time. There is irony, too, in the fact that Pound, who did his own thinking and had spent a lifetime in perfecting ways to express his thought, was judged insane and unaccountable for his statements, whereas young Mrs. D'Aquino was sentenced to ten years and fined ten thousand dollars for one disagreeable and rude remark, probably prepared for her by a script-writer. She asked the G.I.'s how they would get home now that all their ships were sunk.

Mrs. D'Aquino is appealing her case. A book has recently appeared that tells of a case that cannot be appealed because the defendant has been executed. The Japanese General Yamashita ("The Tiger of Malaya") was made the subject of our first war-



The late General Yamashita

crimes trial as soon as he surrendered in 1944 to our mopping-up forces in the Philippines. He was tried by a five-man military commission for crimes committed by Japanese troops under his command. Mr. A. Frank Reel now offers overwhelming proof that Yamashita had not ordered the crimes nor had any opportunity to prevent them.

It would be disingenuous to take too much pride in the way we have dealt with the two Americans—the poet in his mental hospital, Mrs. D'Aquino in her jail, planning her appeal—so long as we leave unappealed to our consciences what we did to a conquered enemy in a vindictive hour.

Grand Central

In our country, people love to go down to the depot and watch the trains go by. In New York, at the Grand Central Terminal, you cannot see the trains because they keep them hidden. The station's concourse, however, used to be the noblest hall in the city. Couples in love made their appointments near the gold clock at its center and, waiting, looked up at the painted firmament on the blue ceiling.



But now Warren and Wetmore's classic walls are covered with three-dimensional advertising. Tea pours endlessly into a cup that never fills; a waiter beams at you, holding a glass that he can never hand you; a grinning sergeant invites you to join the Army; a woman writhes in a small cincture of rubberized cloth; spark plugs flash. Voices from chocolate-colored boxes sell chewing gum, and music comes out of the boxes as from a tap that no one can close. Nothing has so far been done about the stars on the ceiling, however. They are still up there, indifferent, advertising nothing.

Obsidional Fever

Not long ago a statuette of the Virgin, the cherished possession of a little American girl, was reported to be weeping unexplainable tears. Church authorities reserved judgment, and of course we make none—although we were agreeably impressed at the time by the statue's absolute refusal to perform on television. The American government took the matter in its stride and made no comment.

In July of this year the image of the Virgin in Lublin Cathedral, Poland, was also reported to be weeping. In the great crowds that assembled, nineteen were injured and one young woman was killed. For the Virgin's tears even an agnostic might find justification. The Polish government found instead a Catholic plot.

"What was the meaning and purpose of those rumors. . . ? Without pretending to answer . . . authoritatively. . . The 'miracle' occurred precisely at a time when all of Poland was busy with preparations for the national holiday . . . when the farmers were busy gathering their harvests. . . It is not easy at such a time to distract the peasant from his task, an unusual device is needed. . ." Thus spoke

the Polish Research and Information Service.

So it was a clever Catholic plot—or else the Polish government was having one of those hallucinations that afflict the insecure. These Communist régimes, like the Fascist and Nazi régimes, are strong as Macbeth was strong, always pursued by ghosts.

Since the war, we too have gotten the feeling that conspiracies are being hatched all around us. The Spartans used to parade a drunken slave on the streets so that citizens could see what happens to a man when his mind is ill. All we have to do is to look upon these dictatorships obsessed with fear to see what happens to a nation once it gets a persecution complex.

Paris Season

It is just a list of music and expositions: *Phèdre*, with a libretto by Jean Cocteau, music by Georges Auric, at the Opéra; Darius Milhaud's new *Bolivar*; an oratorio by Paul Claudel and Honegger. The Cluny Museum is reopened. A Gauguin show is at the Orangerie in the Tuileries, Matisse was at the Museum of Modern Art, Poussin at the National Library. Why do we print this travel news?

Because the capitals of the world are like ships sailing separate seas.

The cities hurl statistics, politics, riots, birth rates and hunger like signal flares up into the sky, each one saying: Here live human beings. But these signals are too abstract; they are hard for us to read. Somehow it may help a little if we say to each other that there are people in Paris this afternoon looking at pictures in picture galleries, going to the opera this evening, completely disengaged from the Marshall Plan, disinterested momentarily in the atomic bomb, brought into our presence as if they were walking with us in our own American streets. —G. P.



The Vanishing Isolationist



defy the mandates of Congress to serve his foreign masters."

These lines appeared recently in the editorial columns of the *Chicago Tribune*, published by Colonel Robert R. McCormick, the noisiest, if not the outstanding, spokesman for Middle-Western isolationism. Strangers to Chicago might gather that isolationism is reviving in the Middle West. Chicagoans know that around the *Tribune* it has never died. Colonel McCormick believes, as he has since 1942, that the Second World War was thrust upon the American people by a malevolent conspirator named Franklin D. Roosevelt. He also believes that the United Nations is a farce, the Atlantic Pact a sinister internationalist trick, and the Marshall Plan a bumbling fraud perpetrated on the American taxpayer.

People who accept McCormick's own assumption that he speaks for the Middle West will conclude that the great central reaches of America are either on the way back to, or have never left, their historic hostility to any foreign policy except one of proud self-sufficiency.

There is other evidence that this may be true, and not the least revealing is the double about-face executed in the last few years by Everett M. Dirksen, the former Representative from the Peoria district.

In the Eightieth Congress, Dirksen, who is now the leading Republican prospect for the 1950 Senatorial nomination, broke with Illinois isolation-

ism by supporting the Marshall Plan. The people of his district had taken up a collection to send him around the world, and he returned convinced that the United States must recognize its responsibilities of leadership. Now, in his campaign for the Senate, Dirksen is telling the voters that the Marshall Plan has failed and should be abandoned as a bad gamble—a view which he had presumably left behind for all time in 1946.

Then there is Robert Taft of Ohio, the outstanding isolationist in the Senate who is up for re-election in 1950. The victory of a man who voted against the Atlantic Pact and did his best to whittle down the Marshall Plan would surely be taken as a symptom that the Middle West had returned to its isolationist moorings after being cast temporarily adrift by the war.

Congressional roll calls, if they are searched painstakingly enough, may offer some apparent support to the same theory. When the House passed the Military Aid bill, sixty-two of the 122 dissenting votes came from twelve Midwestern states. On the ECA Extension bill last April, thirty-three of the forty-nine negative votes came from the Middle West. On the extension of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, the Middle West supplied thirty-five of the sixty-nine nays in the House, and eight of the nineteen cast in the Senate.

Such statistics sound sweet to Colonel McCormick, who tries hard to persuade himself and the country at large that his native heath supports his peculiar point of view. But the fact is that old-fashioned isolationism has lost its force in the Middle West, as it has elsewhere. Events have outpaced the arguments. Regional differences on foreign policy are still possible, of course. But they are unlikely to follow prewar lines, and there is little tangible evidence that thinking in the Middle

West today differs markedly from that in other sections of the country.

The important fact that emerges from a study of Congressional roll calls is that the isolationist vote as a whole was extremely small. In the House, Military Aid passed by more than two to one; ECA Extension by seven to one; Reciprocal Trade by more than four to one. While seven Midwestern Senators voted against ratification of the Atlantic Pact, seventeen members from the same states voted for it.

Isolationists do still abound in the Middle West. But they do not always win elections, and it has been proved repeatedly that non-isolationists *can* win. If Taft is re-elected next year, it will probably not be his foreign policy, but his challenge to organized labor, that will win for him.

The shrinkage of Colonel McCormick's political influence in Illinois was well demonstrated last year, when his personal Senator, ultra-isolationist C. Wayland Brooks, was decisively defeated by ultra-internationalist Paul Douglas, the University of Chicago economics professor. In the same election, Adlai Stevenson, who represents everything the *Tribune* does not, was elected governor over Dwight Green, McCormick's favorite, by the biggest



majority ever given an Illinois governor.

McCormick's most powerful way of exerting influence has always been a species of political blackmail practiced within the top ranks of the Republican Party. He may not be able to win elections, but he is powerful enough to frighten potential enemies out of the party leadership in Illinois, and one or two neighboring states where the *Tribune's* circulation is strong. Wendell Willkie once complained that he found it impossible to enlist any leaders in Illinois. Sheer funk in the face of the *Tribune's* power to blast reputations dissuaded potential Willkie adherents from sticking their necks out.

Dirksen provides an excellent example of how the *Tribune* can sway a man. Two years ago some of Dirksen's friends began tentatively booming him for national recognition, hoping that his background, plus his conversion to Dewey-Stassen-Willkie internationalism, might make him Republican Vice-Presidential or even, in a pinch, Presidential, timber.

The *Tribune* opened a merciless smear campaign against Dirksen, and

the little boom died a-borning. This year, angling for the Senatorial nomination in a field singularly devoid of *Tribune* minions, Dirksen is doing his best to make himself acceptable to McCormick. His neo-isolationism can be put down to nothing more esoteric than a burning desire to get past the Republican primary without *Tribune* opposition.

McCormick is the most conspicuous relic of a Midwestern isolationism that had several sturdy roots. One was the pacifism of men like Nebraska's George W. Norris, a liberal who believed, during the First World War, that Woodrow Wilson was pulling chestnuts out of the fire for Wall Street. Norris also had a large German constituency, which may well have affected his views. By the late 1930's, however, he had altogether abandoned his earlier position, and was supporting Roosevelt's first moves against the threat of Hitler.

Another highly-influential isolationist was Senator Gerald P. Nye, whose investigation of the munitions makers in the middle 1930's was designed to prove that wars are made by evil capitalists. Nye's inquiries led to the theory of neutrality that beguiled Roosevelt for a few years.

In the 1920's, Mayor "Big Bill" Thompson of Chicago made a public promise to give King George V a crack on the snoot. He was expressing in crude form the Anglophobia that was popular among Irish, Polish, and German constituencies in Midwestern cities. It was comforting, and politically expedient, to regard Britain as the hereditary enemy and the source of all American involvement in foreign affairs. Even McCormick has difficulty in maintaining that position now.

Time has merged the hyphenate groups into the population as a whole, so that, apart from a few professional leaders, the language blocs exert less influence than they did. Moreover, the shift of power from London to Washington is so obvious that the idea of titled Britons manipulating American policy strikes most Middle Westerners (McCormick, as usual, excepted) as absurd.

Thus the roots of mid-continent isolationism—Anglophobia, hostility to Wall Street, and pacifism—are drying up. Even the soil that nourished these roots has undergone a basic change. Isolationism was always a form of insularity. It fed on remoteness from world affairs, on preoccupation with domestic concerns, on detachment from troublesome overseas complications.

Better communication has wiped out that sense of separation. The Iowa farmer may not have fully understood the British devaluation crisis, but he does know that the sterling area's dollar shortage has something to do with his own welfare. A French Cabinet crisis may still seem remote, but the typical Wisconsin burgher now instinctively feels that its consequences somehow concern him as a citizen of the western world.

Let nobody assume that on the Main Streets of the Middle West people eagerly chat about Bevin's latest speech, any more than they do at Forty-second and Broadway. But the Middle Westerner, like the Easterner, no longer imagines that such events cannot affect him. The same external forces that have knit nations together are weaving a closer, more uniform fabric of American public opinion. Purely regional divisions on foreign policy are growing less and less pronounced as time goes by.

So long as there are powerful political organs like the *Tribune*, there will be politicians anxious to follow what they take to be the *Tribune* line. But it is a mistake to assume that the residual isolationism of McCormick is shared to any great degree by the people who buy his newspaper. The underlying evidence points to the conclusion that Midwestern isolationism, as it flourished between the two world wars, is moribund, if not dead.

—ROBERT LASCH



Nobody Votes Against Mother



After years of rehearsal, California politics seems about to achieve the quality of grand opera. The score now being readied for 1950 has sweep, color, and a dozen stirring arias; the book has conflict, plenty of situation gags, and a freshly-acquired national significance; the cast will undoubtedly be rich with impressive voices.

Governor Earl Warren, who will probably run for re-election, and James Roosevelt, who will probably oppose him, have been warming up in the California precincts for some weeks. Mr. Roosevelt, in fact, is fairly radiating expectancy. Behind these two, there are shadowy figures—spear-carriers, puppets, and an abundance of greater and lesser clowns. The players include, among others, lobbyist Artie Samish, the not-so-“Secret Boss of California”; E. George Luckey, a brisk ex-Texan who is rumored, perhaps erroneously, to have raised most of the money that helped carry California for President Truman; and Attorney General Frederick Napoleon Howser, who, in his days of private practice, often defended bookies in court. Add to these the management-AFL-press lobby coalition, which has seen to it that only one Democrat has been governor in the last forty years; the active and blatant left; the confused but numerically-powerful new Californians; and the hundred thousand or more old-age pensioners led by the handsome and nimble George H. McLain. The result unmistakably is opera.

What will lift next year’s performance above the *bouffe* level is a quality that has been missing in California politics until now—an urgency; a sense, half-exuberant, half-brooding, of sudden high position and even

higher promise. Recent population estimates give California the edge over Pennsylvania, making it second to New York. So, in 1952, it may send the second largest number of delegates to the Presidential nominating conventions and have the second-largest electoral vote. By 1960, if its population continues to grow at the present rate, California may possibly have become the first state in the Union.

Here is grandeur indeed, and in the light of it, almost any political activity in California assumes an importance that is automatically national, and that can be international.

California’s political excitement at the moment has mostly to do with the selection of the 1950 candidates for governor, Senator, and lesser offices. Issues are being considered, too, but not as eagerly or searchingly as candidates. The only man now openly running for governor, though he has yet to announce it, is James Roosevelt, whom organization Democrats in northern California have been instructed to call “the visitor,” or “our guest.” Such references are supposed to remind party workers that Mr. Roosevelt moved to California about eight years ago, and to convey the impression that he did so purposely to bring the state into the Roosevelt family, while his brother, Franklin Jr., made off with the East Coast. Northern California Democrats have never forgiven Jimmy, the former Democratic State Chairman, for what they consider his betrayal of President Truman in 1948. Even in southern California, where Jimmy is not regarded as an alien, the story of how he first endorsed Truman in writing, then switched openly to General Eisenhower, is still in wide and damaging circulation. It is probable that both northern and southern California Democrats, who usually have a hard time agreeing on anything, would

back another gubernatorial candidate if they could find one of equal fame in their much-splintered organization.

The principal complaint is that Jimmy doesn’t keep political promises, and that the last man to see him always carries the day. Unhappily, the only Democrat willing to oppose Roosevelt so far is E. George Luckey, a wealthy Imperial Valley cattle-feeder, whose bankroll, Stetson, cowboy boots, diamond ring, and elocution lessons have become points of minor interest at Los Angeles party headquarters. These assets do not seem to be enough, when pitted against the Roosevelt charm, which Jimmy has in abundance. Reluctantly, but surely, Democrats from all over the state are straggling into his brisk and unusually-well-off organization. “What can we do?” one northern California boss sighed recently. “If the name of Roosevelt helped elect men called Harry Truman, Paul Douglas, Adlai Stevenson, Hubert Humphrey, and Chester Bowles across the country, how can it miss with a man who has the magic handle itself?”

If Governor Warren has been pondering this question, he has been doing so privately. The governor is still the chief political figure in California—even though the state’s Civil Service system has just about snatched the wonder-working trick, “patronage,” from his repertoire. He has been bedeviled in the last year by antic fortunes that have brought his prestige dangerously low. His campaign for the Vice-Presidency ruined his reputation for nonpartisanship and unbeatability. Now that there is no doubt about the intensity of his Republicanism, the governor will find it as awkward to cross-file both Democratic and Republican primaries next year as he did last time. His backing of a state

public-health plan, among other "liberal measures," has caused the propertied forces that once thought him one of their own to waver somewhat—and to start booming Lieutenant Governor Goodwin Knight, who seems to be more reliable. On the other hand, the continued sponsorship of Warren by the Chandler-Knowland-Cameron newspaper axis—the Los Angeles Times, Oakland Tribune, and San Francisco Chronicle—causes progressives and independents to think of him as a mossback. Also, the California legislature picked 1949 as the year to scuttle most of the Warren program. Finally, recent statements of Collier's magazine that California is really governed by the hovering, cynical, sometimes kittenish

lobbyist, Artie Samish, gave the Democrats a lot of ammunition. Since the Collier's revelations, politicians who had countenanced Samish's activities for years have displayed astonishment—and blamed the governor.

Such compounded misfortune, plus the fact that no California governor has served three terms (Warren is in his second), has done much to even the odds between the governor and his principal challenger. Ordinarily, Warren might be expected to dodge the ordeal of a third-term campaign by running for the Senate against the one-time Ham and Eggs candidate, Sheridan Downey, who will be up for his third term in 1950. But Warren comes from the wrong county—Ala-

meda, which already has one Senator, William Knowland. If Warren runs for anything, it must almost certainly be for his old job. To win, he must campaign on issues and not on his personality, of which California shows signs of tiring, or his record, which contains many more holding operations than break-throughs.

Having to stick to issues is a worrisome prospect for a California candidate. Unemployment, in which the state still leads the nation, will be one issue. Warren's rejected legislative program will be another. Proposition Four, the Old-Age Pension law now in effect, will be a third highly explosive one, if the current move to repeal it by



referendum fails. Curtailment of the Sacramento lobbies, which are called "The Third House," and are considered more powerful than the other two, will almost certainly be an issue; indeed, Governor Warren may crack down hard on lobbyists, and particularly Samish, who once exclaimed "To hell with the governor, I'm the governor of the legislature!"

Next to the phenomenal population growth, George McLain and his legion of old-age pensioners are probably the most important single political fact in California this autumn. His Proposition Four, which the voters passed a year ago, lifts responsibility for the blind and aged from individuals, or from the counties, and places it on the state. It guarantees the sightless up to eighty-five dollars a month, and the "senior citizens" up to seventy-five. There are over 207,000 eligible aged in California, many of them ready to ring doorbells in behalf of Proposition Four. It is easy to see that McLain, who made pensions possible, may be a pivotal power.

California, as all politicians are well aware, has never had an effective precinct organization, because, since the great Hiram Johnson housecleaning before the First World War, it has never had a statewide party machine. Johnson, who became governor in 1911, effectively broke the utilities' and railroads' grip on local politics by eliminating party lines in civic and county elections, and by introducing the direct primary, referendum and recall, and women's suffrage.

California has since lacked a machine because local candidates have been able to file on any kind of ticket they chose, and if elected, rarely owed anything to anybody—except, perhaps, the lobbyist who may have raised their campaign funds for them. George McLain, whose followers are willing to work harder than Tammany Democrats, may now have filled this vacuum; he may very possibly have put together the first really powerful statewide precinct organization in California history. Certainly a great many California political observers seem to think so.

Governor Warren and James Roosevelt have already felt obliged to announce publicly that they have made no deals for McLain support. Bank-

ers in San Francisco's Montgomery Street have vowed to raise thousands to try to strike Proposition Four from the list of state constitutional amendments—apparently in fear that McLain may gather his forces and set out to capture any political office he pleases. Former Attorney General Robert Kenny, a far-sighted gentleman, has seen fit to appear in Sacramento as counsel for the pensioners, which is tantamount, in state political terms, to boarding the McLain train. Policy-setters from all sections of the state have raised the cry that pension costs will bankrupt California, that Proposition Four is collectivism, and that it will surely set every pension-seeker east of the Sierras in motion toward the Pacific—all statements that have yet to be proven.

There is an unruffled, confident quality about McLain and his Citizens' Committee for Old-Age Pensions that sets old-line politicians' teeth on edge. An amiable positiveness crops up in McLain's daily radio talks and his frequent interviews, indicating that he knows a great deal that he isn't divulging about the potential political power of the organized aged.

Next to the incredible Samish, George McLain probably understands more about practical California politics than any other current practitioner. This is saying a good deal, for California politics is bizarre—with no machine control, few party-financed campaigns, no patronage grab-bag, a districting system that keeps the upper house as flexible as a rubber band, and overwhelmingly powerful lobbyists. Very few people in or out of California have ever been able to predict how the state would vote—as was proven again by the 1948 Presidential election. McLain's mystical apparatus for charting public-opinion vibrations has been pronounced very superior—a fact that makes rumors of his coming support of the Roosevelt Democrats particularly interesting. If the pension promo-



ter believes that Jimmy Roosevelt will be the next Governor of California, and, more important, is willing to back his prognosis with a doorbell-ringing campaign such as the state has never seen, the present gloom of most local Republican leaders can be readily understood.

Whatever McLain chooses to do in the near future, he is certain to lend a kind of "Room Service" tone to California's greatest political drama. Assisting him, and the other leads, will be a band of lightfooted political press agents. In any California spectacle, these spear-carriers, who angle the issues to achieve their employers' ends, should be watched as carefully as the main political leads.

For a sample of the press agents' work, a visit to the two-man public relations firm that has been hired by the McLain forces to manufacture propaganda is rewarding. In the firm's bare and badly-lighted offices a few weeks ago, the two men involved sat with their feet hoisted, soberly scrutinizing a photograph of a handsome, elderly woman who looked out, as though in sweet pain, from a half-completed poster.

"Nobody," one press agent murmured, "is going to vote against Mother."

The other studied the face with narrowed eyes. "I think the caption should be very simple," he said. "It should say 'Why do they hate me? Vote No on Proposition Two!' [the proposition to repeal Proposition Four] and let it go. There is absolutely no point in confusing the voters."

The first press agent smiled happily.

"We will need a man's face to go with Mother on the billboards," he remarked.

"That," said his colleague, "should be no problem at all. For the model, we can use the face on the Old Granddad bottle. Thousands know that face from somewhere. We will have the artist take off Granddad's glasses, and there he is—everybody's father. We will make the billboard slogan read, 'Why Do They Hate Us?'"

Serenity illumined the faces of the press agents. In their expressions was something that promised great discomfiture to their enemies, and great moments in the forthcoming drama.

—RICHARD A. DONOVAN

State Department, New Model



Dean Gooderham Acheson is the first Secretary of State in two full decades who has come to his post after a rigorous apprenticeship in diplomacy. Abetted by his immediate predecessors,

by the President, and by circumstance, he has created a new State Department—the kind that Washington has often talked about but never expected to get.

For the first time in the memory of living men, the American foreign office comes somewhere near being adequate to the needs of the country. The department is by no means monarch of all it surveys, but it is, at last, master of its own soul. It has unity, strong leadership, and a modern perspective.

A dozen years ago, a United States Ambassador to Cuba could say: "Diplomacy . . . nowadays consists largely in cooperating with American business." In 1949, what our diplomats do is of interest not only to New York export-import firms or American entrepreneurs abroad. The government's handling of the issues of war and peace is vitally important to the milkman in Santa Fe and the housewife in Pawtucket—to say nothing of the London cabbie and the Ruhr coal miner.

In organizing and staffing his department, Acheson has recognized this fact. The agency is becoming an increasingly representative collection of all the skills and interests that ought to bear on foreign policy. The corps of traditional diplomats of the Foreign Service—whose talents continue to be indispensable—is now outnumbered by a band of labor attachés, agricultural experts, economists, trade specialists, cultural attachés, and scriptwriters for the Voice of America. While the liberal press may continue to dis-

trust certain policies of the department, it can no longer reject the men who shape them as members of a narrow, high-falutin' class.

The new department, of course, did not spring full-blown from the brow of the present secretary. Since 1939, the agency has grown from four thousand men and women to twenty thousand. Inevitably, the well-to-do families of the eastern seaboard fell behind in providing manpower for this expansion. Secretary Byrnes made his contribution to a revamped personnel roster with the Foreign Service Act of 1946, which strengthened and enlarged the Foreign Service. Secretary Marshall performed a miracle in reorganizing his own office so that when the secretary pressed the starter, something happened in the machinery.

Mr. Acheson's contribution, nevertheless, is the capstone. It rests firmly on the fact that, before he assumed office, he had had unique opportunities for observing his department. General Marshall once remarked that it had taken him a year to get acquainted with America's foreign office. Mr. Acheson had spent eight years at it, dealing with such diverse matters as economic warfare, Congressional relations, and atomic energy. He was an Assistant Secretary from 1941 to 1945. As Under Secretary until 1947, he was executive officer of the department, and thus got a bird's-eye view of it. After that he returned to private law practice, but even then, as Vice-Chairman of the Hoover Commission on Executive Reorganization, he had an unusual chance to analyze the department from the outside. When the Hoover Commission delivered its report on the agency, Washington newspapermen recognized it as the lineal descendant of "Plan X," a series of reorganization studies that Mr. Acheson had sponsored as Under Secretary.

The present structure of the department was not, however, created merely by plan. It is based on a complex of personal relationships. The first, and most important, is that between the Secretary and the President. When Mr. Truman was riding back to Washington a year ago, right after the election, he turned to a visitor in his special railroad car, broke into a smile, and said, "Now I can have Dean." Mr. Acheson was sworn in the day after the President.

There is full faith and easy understanding between Mr. Truman and his Secretary of State, as there was not between Franklin Roosevelt and Cordell Hull, nor between Mr. Truman and Mr. Byrnes. The President admired General Marshall enormously, but his appointment did not represent a free choice, for when it was made Republican majorities were swarming on the battlements of Capitol Hill.

Mr. Acheson is a personal choice, and a servant of the President in a way that the former Army Chief of Staff, with his tremendous prestige, could never have been. Acheson, while not a political figure, belongs to the President's party. He is aware, unlike some of his predecessors, that the President is ultimately responsible for the execution of foreign policy. Secretary Byrnes very often in his public pronouncements used to say, "I"; Mr. Acheson very often says, "the President." Mr. Truman, in turn, frequently remarks in press conferences that a question already has been covered comprehensively by the secretary.

This relationship between the President and his first-ranking Cabinet officer has a logical consequence which makes for another vital difference between Acheson's department and its predecessors: The department is run by its chief. At various times, Mr. Hull had to contend with at least three

subordinates (Under Secretary Welles, and Assistant Secretaries Moley and Berle) who had independent access to Franklin Roosevelt, and whose ideas sometimes triumphed over those of the Secretary of State.

While Mr. Hull's successors did not have comparable White House trouble, they failed in another direction. They did not harness the Foreign Service to their own policies. Even Marshall tended merely to preside over the department and the service, rather than to direct them. As a result, important problems did not always find their way up to the highest policy levels.

Today, Secretary Acheson has no subordinates who can bring to bear political or internal sources of power superior to his. He has picked his team, and he is its undisputed leader. His Under Secretary, James E. Webb, former Budget Bureau Director, a stubby, hard-driving North Carolinian, functions at staff meetings as a manager, not as an honorary presiding officer.

Of Acheson's thirteen aides at or above the level of assistant secretary, three are personal protégés: Adrian Fisher, Legal Adviser; Edward G. Miller, Jr., Assistant Secretary for American Republic Affairs; and John E. Peurifoy, Deputy Under Secretary (for administration), and author of much of "Plan X." The others, with no important exception, either began their departmental careers in close association with Acheson, or owe their present status specifically to his recognition of

their talents. Some of them, like Dean Rusk, Deputy Under Secretary (for political affairs), might have left the department had it not been for the prospects of intellectual excitement and tangible achievement that Mr. Acheson was able to offer.

Of these top thirteen men, only four are career officers of the Foreign Service. Neither Acheson nor the majority of his ranking assistants have a vested interest in the policy mistakes of yesterday. Few of them have anything to win by caution, *politesse*, or the seniority system of advancement.

As a group, the members of the hierarchy are remarkably young, and widely varied in experience. Their average age is in the mid-forties. One of the ranking members, Mr. Peurifoy, started off as an elevator boy in the Capitol. In addition to the four career diplomats (whose major experience falls in Europe, the Middle East, and the Far East), the hierarchs also include three college professors (of government, economics, and international law), three businessmen (Sperry Gyroscope, Merck & Company, and Texas oil) and three lawyers (one from the U. S. Atomic Energy Commission, one from Sullivan & Cromwell, and a third who jumped from the National Association of Manufacturers to the staff of the National Labor Relations Board). Such a massive transfusion of new blood into the top directorate of the department has not occurred since 1933.

Early last month, the department announced a fundamental reorganization. Unlike the musical-chair reshufflings chronic in the past decade, it is a genuine change. Briefly, it reduces the number of basic structural units in the department from nearly four hundred to just over two hundred. The agency, which used to be organized in a highly mixed-up pattern, is now set up along frankly geographical lines.

The "functional" assistant secretaries, operating in such fields as economic affairs (Willard L. Thorp) and international information (at the moment of writing George V. Allen), have been relieved of considerable routine to concentrate on policy.

The five other assistant secretaries, for geographical areas of the world and for United Nations affairs, take on new duties, with new instruments at their disposal. Under each of them is a new



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James E. Webb

unit, called a bureau. In each of these bureaus will be concentrated a knowledge and a responsibility that formerly was scattered broadside through the department. Such a unit as the Bureau of European Affairs, for instance, now has its own economists, its own labor specialists, and its own liaison officers for tapping the research facilities of the department. The Assistant Secretary supervising a bureau will have new freedom to deal directly with representatives abroad. He will have substantive responsibilities for such previously semi-autonomous activities as the international information program.

Two other functions of the department ought to be mentioned. There is now an Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations for the first time since Mr. Acheson himself left the job four years ago. This official, appointed less than a month after the new Secretary took office, is Ernest A. Gross. He acts as traffic manager for the legislation the department sends to Capitol Hill; he tries to see that Congressmen who have questions get answers from the appropriate experts throughout the department.

State also has a valuable adjunct in its small Policy Planning Staff, established by General Marshall in 1947, and directed ever since by George F. Kennan, now Counselor of the Department. Kennan, a career diplomat with experience in central Europe and the U.S.S.R., is supposed, with his staff,



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George F. Kennan

to think about problems to which no one else is giving thought. His job may involve policy planning on a deadline of twenty-four hours, or of thirty years. While his line of command leads from Under Secretary Webb, he also works closely with the National Security Council, the Cabinet board that coordinates America's diplomatic and military postures.

A great deal can still be done to improve the Department of State. The amalgamation of the Foreign Service into the larger career structure of the agency, recommended by the Hoover Commission, is just getting under way; since July 1, some thirty career diplomats long abroad have been brought back for assignments in State and other departments, and some thirty departmental employees have been sent to overseas posts normally filled by the Foreign Service. The department's ambassadorial representation on the continent of Europe has in some spots been fearfully mediocre for the past three



Harris & Ewing

George V. Allen

years; it may be a good sign that ambassadors, including political appointees, are now being subjected to the same kind of assessment procedure that previously applied only to their subordinates. Lamentably, the department still does not know how to encourage and use scholarly research; both the Air Force and the Navy are carrying on more thorough investigations of some subjects that are the primary business of State.

The department's troubles do not end with these. Unlike Britain's Foreign Office, State does not have the last word on foreign policy. It is only one of nearly sixty agencies that have a say in dealing with nations abroad. The department, for instance, may preach the gospel of lower tariff barriers, and may negotiate a fifty-per cent reduc-



Harris & Ewing

Willard L. Thorp

tion of the duty on New Zealand butter; but the Secretary of Agriculture can still declare butter to be in surplus supply, and forbid its importation from any other country. The department can talk about freedom of information, but the Attorney General can still refuse to admit foreign Communist journalists to the same privileges in this country that State demands for American reporters in eastern Europe.

Beyond the hazards of the executive branch lies Congress. For most foreign programs, State must not only have enabling legislation, but also money. That means running the gantlet of two committees in each house, and it sometimes appears that each committee is determined either to ignore the other three or to assume that they are heading in exactly the wrong direction.

The result, according to one well-informed observer, is that the top officers of the department must spend up to seventy per cent of their time negotiating policy with the American government itself; the remaining thirty per cent can be devoted to a study of

America's position in the world. The execution of policy not only proceeds on this narrow base, but it proceeds in slow motion. In launching new programs, at least a year may pass between the wish and the deed. In the case of the Military Assistance Program, twenty months will have elapsed between the first decisions to make arms shipments and the departure of the first ship.

That leads to the department's next dilemma. A strategy designed in 1950 may be confounded by world events before it can be launched in 1951. And when it comes to anticipating the world of 1951, the department, like the rest of us, sees through a glass, darkly. State obviously has no control over such possibilities as an American deflation that would wipe out the effects of devaluation abroad. It cannot foresee in detail the serious stresses, both political and economic, that will arise among the western democracies if the dollar crisis continues.

In a real sense, the department, as one of its planners says, can make "only the minor decisions." The world moves; the department moves along with it, hopeful rather than certain that the rate and direction of global turnings are being properly gauged. That does not detract from the real importance of Secretary Acheson's achievement. The country now has a State Department that can move, and a foreign office that is no longer its own worst problem.

—HAROLD N. GRAVES, JR.



Harris & Ewing

Dean Rusk

Pilgrim's Progress



Recovery—at a Bargain Price

More than a billion people in the area bounded by Pakistan, India, China, and Indonesia live in poverty inconceivable to most Americans. These people comprise half the world's population, but they consume less than thirty per cent of its food, they own less than two per cent of its motor cars, less than ten per cent of its railroads, about two per cent of its steelmaking facilities, and slightly over one per cent of its electric-power generating capacity. One of every five babies born in this region dies in its first year, and the average human life span is only about twenty-eight years, whereas in the United States it is sixty-seven.

Even if we did not have moral obligations toward these people, it would be in our interest to help them. Asia on the upgrade would be a tremendous market for our goods; Asia on the downgrade is a likely market only for Communism and extremism.

We are already spending about four billion dollars per year to aid western Europe. The peoples of Asia are five times as numerous and thirty times as poor as the people of Europe. Clearly, if we were to give aid to Asia on the basis of these proportions, we would be bankrupt within a year.

Will it actually cost more to aid Asia effectively than it does to aid western Europe? It is misleading to base estimates of Asia's needs on our European experience. The problem in Asia is as difficult, if not more so, than that of Europe, but its solution does not necessarily depend on giving away billions.

Asia, being primarily agrarian, is not as dependent on foreign trade for its livelihood as western Europe is. Excluding Japan, all the Asiatic nations together imported, in 1937, less than two-thirds as much as the United Kingdom alone. The fact that the Asiatic peoples are accustomed to a standard of living only about one thir-

tieth as high as that of most of the people in Europe means that much of the kind of aid that has been necessary under the Marshall Plan will be unnecessary in Asia.

The Asiatic worker's need for consumer goods cannot approach the European level for decades. The Indian untouchable or Burmese plantation worker, never having known any but the lowest living standards, will be satisfied for some time with what will seem, by western criteria, to be ridiculously modest advances in the way of food and clothing. Proportionately less of America's resources will have to be used to acquire or produce consumer goods for Asia, and more can be used to purchase and install machinery and other types of equipment needed for long-term development. An illustration of the basic difference between the problems of Europe and Asia is the fact that living standards in the United Kingdom are so much higher than they are in India that, despite the fact that there are seven times as many Indians as Britishers, it would take about three times the quantity of consumer goods to raise the British standard ten per cent as it would to raise India's equally.

The most important reason why economic aid for Asia need not cost as much as the European program is that Asia needs a different kind of help. The Marshall Plan is meant to be an enormous shot in the arm that will shock the European economies back onto their feet within four years. It is not the sort of venture that can be carried by private enterprise. In Asia, the need is not for a quick hypodermic, but for smaller doses of economic aid over a longer period. The doses could, if conditions were right, be given in large part by private enterprise rather than by the American taxpayer.

Asia's national economies are suffering from retarded growth. Populations

have grown at very rapid rates. Means of production have not. In western Europe, the average worker has nearly two and a half mechanical horsepower working for him, increasing his economic productivity twentyfold over what it would be if he relied only on his own strength. The American worker has over seven mechanical horsepower at his command. The Asiatic worker, on the average, has less than one tenth of one mechanical horsepower to help him do his work. Asia's problem is to modernize its productive techniques and enlarge its capital plant—to apply more advanced methods of farming and production, install power plants, build factories, irrigate land, and introduce better varieties of seed—to take the thousands of steps by which the western worker has increased his productivity so immensely in a hundred years while that of his Asiatic brother has been standing still.

Dollar aid from the United States government can be a great help in this task, but it will not be the decisive factor in its success. Economic growth in Asia must be self-generating: Skills will have to propagate skills; profits from increased production will have to be used in part for reinvestment in order to buy more machines. Growth must feed further growth until Asia has achieved reasonable economic stature. Dollars can help to start this process and speed it up, but its success will mostly depend on factors within the Asiatic countries themselves. If these factors are present, a comparatively small amount of dollar aid will go a long way; if they are not, no amount of aid will make any real difference.

The most discouraging sign for Asia's future is the widespread absence of governments that can provide effective economic leadership. In most cases, only the government is in a position to supply any economic leader-

ship. Few Asiatic administrations have shown any capacity for this. In Burma, half a dozen contending parties are fighting it out for power. In Indonesia and Indo-China, European and native leaders have used their energies mainly to fight each other. In Malaya there has been no war as yet, but there is some possibility of one. In the Philippines, governmental corruption is an increasing problem. In China, the Communists are at best an unknown quantity, while the Nationalists have distinguished themselves chiefly for their ability to make a lot of money go a short way.

Other major obstacles that will limit the speed and effectiveness of an economic program for Asia are the lack of private savings for investment purposes—a situation inherent in countries of low productivity—and the traditional Asiatic cultures, which cannot easily be adapted to modern economic organization. To compensate for lack of savings, governments will probably have to resort to selective taxation to force existing capital into productive uses, and to high taxes in general in order that there may be resources to carry out the investment process. Breaking down cultural resistance to modernization may also require special measures.

There are, however, a number of encouraging signs. The unrest presently running through the Far East is in large part the unrest of people who want to rid themselves of foreign domination. When it has run its course—and in India and Indonesia it has gone a long way—it may result in the freeing of a greater amount of energy for economic leadership and improvement than has ever been available before.

A second hopeful factor is the remarkable progress made by India since the end of the war. This nation has survived partition and predictions of chaos to emerge as a potential leader of Asiatic economic growth. It has the second largest population in the Far East and the second largest economic plant. India's leaders have made mistakes: There has been a striving for industrial growth to the detriment of agricultural improvement; there has been some wastage of foreign exchange; and there has been a display of shortsighted economic bellicosity toward Japan. On the whole, however, India's leaders have been moving in the right

direction, and, if this movement continues, it will pull a large part of the Far East along.

The Bombay Plan, made by a group of Indian industrialists, outlines in part the path that the government is taking and gives an idea of India's possibilities. It calls for a 130-per cent increase in agricultural output, a fivefold increase in industrial production, and doubling of per-capita national income in fifteen years. The cost of this plan, as estimated in terms of present prices, is about five billion dollars per year, nearly eighty-three per cent of which would be met from internal sources, twelve per cent from Indian-owned external wealth or from trade earnings, and only five per cent from foreign loans. If the United States were to supply all of the foreign credit required annually under the plan, the investment would amount to only about 250 million dollars—approximately six per cent of what we spend yearly on the Marshall Plan.

The third development that will help provide a solution to Asia's economic problems is the recent broadening of our foreign economic policy. Point Four of the President's inaugural speech can, of course, be a great step forward if it ever comes off the Wash-

ington drawing boards in the form of an operating policy. Lack of "know-how" in the Far East is probably a greater detriment to economic growth than lack of dollars. Another substantial move forward is the Administration proposal still before Congress to permit the Export-Import Bank to guarantee private entrepreneurs against risks peculiar to foreign investment.

It is difficult to estimate what Asia's real chances are of starting on a period of long-term economic growth. Continuing political turmoil and unrest wouldn't bode well for such development. In China, Indonesia, Burma, and Indo-China, enough production has been lost due to fighting to have financed ten years of the Bombay Plan.


Despite this uncertainty, a program of United States aid is still a good calculated risk. There are areas in the Far East where the required political stability already may have been achieved, or soon will be—India, the Philippines, possibly even Indonesia, if the fighting there ends for good.

We already have a fair outline of the program we should follow: Point Four; guarantees to private investors; loans by established agencies such as the World Bank and the Export-Import Bank; and grants by ECA to the colonial areas of ERP countries. We might also start making additional purchases in the Far East of goods such as rubber, tin, quinine, mica, and graphite for our strategic stockpiles (on condition that the proceeds of the purchases be applied to economic development). We could also use our position in Japan to direct the industrial capacity of that nation toward the production of capital goods for the rest of Asia, rather than toward the complete re-establishment of Japan's prewar consumer-goods industries.

Our thinking with respect to aid for Asia should incorporate two basic concepts: First, that the task will be mainly one of internal economic growth, requiring not a tremendous outpouring of American resources within a few years, but sustained aid of a strategic nature over a long period of time. Second, if strong growth from within can be initiated, it will overcome by itself most of the obstacles that face it. We must use our resources to help Asiatic countries begin to use their own.

—VINCENT CHECCHI

TRUMAN REVEALS RED A-BLAST



REPRESENTATIVE RANKIN'S two proposals: "(1) Prepare a national capital in the area around Paducah, Kentucky, and (2) Speed construction of an inland water route connecting the Tennessee River with the Gulf of Mexico by way of the Tombigbee River."

The Duties of a Creditor



A recent editorial in *The Reporter* ("Time for Reckoning—East and West," September 13) said that international economic developments had been "an extraordinary postgraduate

course in international economics" for the United States. That was true then, and is even truer now. Everything that has happened since, and in particular the devaluation of European currencies, has made it even more urgent that the new course should be attended faithfully. In learning about international economics, it is most important to listen to voices from overseas—especially those from Britain, where international economics have been for a long time a major theme in public life.

The most vital lessons that the United States must learn are the duties of a creditor country.

Not all of these duties are apparent to us yet. First of all, the basic duty of a creditor is to live well and to enjoy a standard of living above his standard of production. This he can do immediately by consuming more than he produces, or he can postpone consumption to a future date by lending his surpluses to other nations. But whether it is faced or postponed, his basic duty is to live well. In a universally rich world, the duty of the creditor might be discharged by producing less without consuming less. In a poor and hungry world like ours, this duty can only be discharged by producing to the limit and consuming even above the limit of home production, now or in the future. For a creditor must buy elsewhere more than he can produce by himself. The alternative is ruin.

This is something Americans will have to learn, however much it may go

against the national grain. If the American insists on producing at such a high level—and in doing so he is the standby, the hope, and the precept of the world—then he must learn to buy even more than he produces. The motto of the creditor is "buy or die." If he does not buy other people's goods and services in excess of what he produces, then he must make gifts from his own production to other people.

This postwar situation may well be another "American dilemma." If the national character cannot be sufficiently remolded to permit an "economic" form of assistance by large-scale imports of foreign goods, then the national character will have to determine the nature of assistance—for assistance to the friendly world there will have to be. In that case, foreign aid will have to take the "un-economic" form of grants wrapped up in loans, straight grants, special loans, sharing in armament and other burdens, and long-term investment. If a universal creditor nation wants to retain the characteristics of a hard-working, fully-productive society such as ours, its citizens may have to get reconciled to seeing some of the fruits of their activities and labors go abroad. A leisurely, luxurious, and easygoing America might be nationalistic, and refuse to give away its surpluses if any. But a hard-working, fully-productive America will have to be internationally-minded.

So far we have made it clear that the alternatives before Americans are to produce less—which would be a tragedy for the world—or import more, or make gifts. The most desirable thing, clearly, is to import more, and to "accept" foreign goods more freely. That duty of the good creditor has become fairly obvious to us by now. But have all its implications been faced?

To "accept" imports is a vague, passive attitude. Such things as tariffs and

customs procedures are part of it. But there is more to it than that. The selling of their goods in our economy might confront the European countries with a task beyond their strength, especially as long as it would have to be done against the tide of domestic lobbies. European statesmen and exporters must be excused if they cannot view the extravaganzas of the honeybee or paper-flag lobbies in Congress with amused detachment. If selling is impossible, "acceptance" is futile.

What it comes to is this: America will have to abandon its deep-rooted protectionist ideas and get used to the idea that its job must now be reversed. The international duty of America is not fulfilled when American goods are made and sold to the world. It must sell even more foreign goods to itself. Here is a new test for American salesmanship: to make—or listen to—the foreigner's sales talk as well as one's own.

How can this be done? One solution now discussed in Britain would be to interest the exporters of American goods in the import—and sale in U. S. markets—of goods given in return for theirs. Thus a concentrated domestic lobby of importing interests, and not of scattered foreign interests, would be created which would be interested in the sale of imported goods, to balance the pressure for the export of domestic goods.

That would be a thoroughly healthy development, but it poses some interesting questions. Are the duties of the debtor country exhausted by the production and the provision of goods of the kind that the creditor country wants to consume? Could Britain discharge its commitments by handing us goods of the requisite value and of the right kind, such as Scotch whisky, tweeds, or vouchers for tourists, and leave it to syndicates of American ex-

porters of cotton, tobacco, and machinery to sell them to American drinkers, clothing retailers, and tourists?

There is yet another way in which the duties of a creditor may be expanded. America still manages to combine a maximum of domestic capital formation—forty billion dollars or more each year—with a minimum of private foreign investment—less than three per cent of domestic investment. This is an abnormal distribution for the world's leading economic power. When Britain was in a comparable position some fifty years ago, it invested around fifty per cent of its total savings abroad. Even if we add the ERP and the rest of the government-paid export surplus, the U. S. foreign investment is only about ten per cent of the total formation, and this will decline with the cutting of ERP appropriations. Is it not the duty of the world's leading economic power to aim at the investment abroad of perhaps one sixth or one fifth of its domestic capital? This might require steps beyond the guarantees now studied as part of Point Four, and beyond the time limit now set for ending ERP. It may involve recommendations by the government to private U. S. investors for specific investments abroad, or other measures beyond the contemplated guarantees.

The mention of Point Four brings to mind another unsolved problem in international economics. To the American who naturally concentrates his attention on the balance of transactions between the dollar and the pound sterling, it appears that Britain lives "beyond its means"—that it lives as if the dollar world owed it a living, that it is becoming an international as well as a domestic welfare state. The Britisher is aware that his country has managed, against great odds, to achieve an overall balance of trade and payments that is favorable. However, the problem is not the over-all balance, but the dollar balance. Except in relation to the dollar, Britain is giving out far more to the rest of the world than it receives. To the extent that Britain is a "welfare state" at the receiving end in relation to the dollar area, it is a welfare state at the giving end in relation to the rest of the world. In particular, the working off of the sterling balances of India,

Pakistan, Brazil, Egypt et al. by British exports may be said to be a big—perhaps too big—British contribution in the spirit of Point Four.

In addition, continuing British foreign investment is by no means negligible, and it is certainly abnormally large in relation to American foreign investment, when account is taken of our immeasurably stronger position. The view that is heard among the experts in Britain, and should be studied here, is that perhaps so far most of the effective burden of Point Four activities has fallen on Britain, and that, therefore, ERP is partly an indirect discharge by the United States of functions assumed by Britain. An alternative—also much discussed on the other side—is that we should relieve Britain of some of these "unrequited exports" and undertake Point Four more directly by supplying India and other present

TRUMAN REVEALS RED A-BLAST



BURKE BAKER, President of the American General Life Insurance Company: "Insurance policies are spread over the population so generally that there is no concentrated risk."

recipients of these exports on credit, in return for a reduction in the sterling balances. The wartime origin of the sterling balances, to the British mind, lends moral force to such concepts of "sharing the burden." Perhaps aid to Europe and Point Four have been much more closely intertwined than is realized here. ERP has been the price of avoiding the full assumption of the duties of the world banker.

That lesson of the nineteenth century cannot be stressed too much. The impression that the nineteenth-century trading system, with its development of overseas areas (including the United States) was in any sense "automatic," is mistaken. The nineteenth-century worldwide trading system was only kept functioning because the universal creditor—the City of London—was also the universal banker. It was only by adopting a view of "the world is my field," and by scattering British savings throughout the world, that the system—so beneficial to Britain itself for its flow of cheap food and raw materials and worldwide markets—was kept going. Americans have not yet adopted the view that the world is the field for American savings. American savings are now infinitely larger than British savings ever were. Yet the amount that travels abroad is infinitely smaller. The investment of American savings abroad is still considered as a marginal—somewhat abnormal—procedure. Point Four is a first step in making the procedure appear a little less abnormal to the investor.

It is an interesting reflection that perhaps we owe our present status as an industrial power, and a universal creditor, as well as our enormous capital accumulation, to the scattering of European—especially of British—savings abroad. The real accumulation by which this country was set on the road of industrial development consisted in the transfer of capital through immigrants. It was not so much the tangible capital that they brought to these shores as an enormous intangible investment in food, clothing, educating, and training. This would not have been possible without the free flow of food and raw materials to Europe, resulting from European investments abroad. They gave Europe the means to afford the luxury first of feeding, clothing, educating, and training so many millions, and then releasing them from their social duty of producing for Europe to make a gift of them to America.

That was indeed a gigantic prototype of Point Four. It helped to spread industrialization over the western world. It was only made possible by recognizing the duty of a creditor country to scatter its savings over the world.

—H. W. SINGER

Unite or Else



In the last three months the entire aspect of Europe has changed, politically and economically, both in its inner structure and in its relation to the United States. The European atmos-

phere is different now, and for one main reason: The first and simplest phase of the Marshall Plan has just been completed. No one had been able to predict the form the second phase would have to take. Now, in extreme confusion, this second phase has begun.

The immediate aim of the Marshall Plan, rebuilding the machinery of European production to its prewar capacity, was achieved speedily and satisfactorily. While this process was going on, the problems of internal politics and international relationships were not very complex, for the task at hand was about as straightforward as setting up an army in wartime. Today we face another matter altogether. We must find a way in which the various economic potentials that have been rebuilt can work together and establish a balance. To use a military term again, we have to formulate a strategy. When we come to this problem, the conflict of contrasting theories and of national and material interests arises. One may say that it is only today—four years after the end of the war and two years after the United States started its systematic effort to assist Europe—that the basic question has emerged: What shape must be given to the western community?

Until now the question had never been clearly put—and still less clearly answered—by political strategists. As a result, the pressure of circumstance is now forcing us to improvise wildly. One may say that the main circumstances in the last months have been:

the elections favoring the more conservative European parties (in Belgium and in Germany), the economic crisis in Britain, and America's lessening confidence in the political instruments set up to organize European economy, such as the Organization for European Economic Cooperation.

As a result of these factors, there have been two major developments: the wave of devaluation of European currencies, and a very great lessening of Socialist influence in French internal affairs. Moreover, with America's support, a new concept of Europe has arisen—a concept which sees Britain on one side, and on the other a more conservative group made up at present of France, Italy, and the Benelux countries.

Before we allow circumstances to carry us further along the path on which we are now proceeding, it is necessary to inquire where that path is leading the West.

For the moment it is convenient and reassuring to think of the British crisis as an isolated event; that is an illusion which must soon disappear. Britain is not an element differing in nature from the European group of nations; Britain is only the most complex and consequently the most fragile element in the European whole. And just as the Anglo-American financial agreement of 1946 was bound to be succeeded, a year later, by an over-all plan, the Marshall Plan, so Britain's crisis is only a few months ahead of a general crisis in Europe.

This internal crisis of the western community, when it comes, will be extremely complex—just as the British crisis is highly complicated. That is why it will be so dangerous, for the Marxist malediction prophesying a western collapse through the “internal contradictions of capitalism” will appear justified and inevitable. Actu-

ally, there is no such fatal determinism; there is only an underlying and profound misunderstanding. The misunderstanding is this: Many American and European leaders are attempting to set up a western community on an orthodox economic basis. To such an undertaking there can be no issue, for the western community we seek to build is and must be essentially political.

It is not impossible, of course, that America will withdraw from Europe at the moment that the western crisis attains its highest intensity. That is not our view; we assume the opposite hypothesis: that America is firmly determined to build a united West. As to the manner in which Americans plan to go about it, the last few weeks have somewhat enlightened us. The American attitude can be summed up in one principle: an obsession with economic orthodoxy.

The construction, according to them, will stand up firmly completed and strong only when the *artificial* expedients (among others, Marshall Plan aid) have disappeared and the economic cycle is functioning once again according to *natural* economic laws.

Senator Vandenberg recently reminded Europeans that American assistance must some day come to an end. Paul Hoffman has succinctly and clearly defined the goal he is after: America must reach a point where it no longer has to carry Europe on its back. This obviously means that economic balance must be sought by allowing an increasingly free play to natural economic laws. Everything that keeps these laws from working must be progressively suppressed—subsidies, quotas, economic discriminations of all kinds, the assumption by the state of deficits (nationalization). The plans that have been established in Washington and Strasbourg follow this general

line. These plans have brought on the general uneasiness that lies over Europe and can result only in crisis.

The method that is being used would be the right method—at least theoretically—if the western world were a truly natural economic community disturbed at present only by the accident of war and the aftermath of war.

The very opposite, however, is true. Let us look at the group of western European nations. Were they to follow their natural economic bent they would link themselves with eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R. Political interests lead this group of nations to turn toward the West, and strategic collaboration with the United States. The ensuing economic difficulties, if they are to be resolved, obviously will not be resolved by letting nature take its course, for that would drive Europe toward the East. There lies the problem: It is not impossible to solve if its terms are set. But today all is confusion, and it may be foreseen that confusion will continue until a serious and widespread crisis comes along to smash the whole idea of a solution through economics and not through politics.

An absorbingly interesting laboratory experiment is being carried out right under our eyes, and it shows very clearly the nature of the American illusion. It is the experiment taking place in the western sectors of Berlin, which are a perfect miniature of the bridgehead that Europe itself constitutes. For a year, West Berlin lived in the most artificial way conceivable, according to all the classic rules—through the airlift. Some months ago the blockade was lifted, and, as a consequence, Berlin has been brought back into its normal orbit by joining it directly and freely

to the western zones. The airlift, an artificial process, is finished. The economists are delighted—and West Berlin is dying. The last report from the American military government describes the situation as "hopeless." A quarter of the working population is out of work, and the total of unemployment is increasing at the rate of five thousand a week. The city is flooded with products coming from the western zones, and is unable to sell these zones anything in exchange.

The conclusion to all this is simple. Either we keep on applying the dogma of economic orthodoxy, in which case Berlin will return, after a catastrophe, to its natural economic community, which is to the East, or—and this is more probable—we will recognize the political character of the links which bind Berlin to the West, and artificial processes, such as subsidies, will be employed to integrate Berlin's economy with that of the West.

Europe's problem is almost as simple. The proof will take more time, but inevitably it will come. Devaluation, or other techniques, for a time can mask the fundamental simplicity of the situation. Yet, as Léon Blum himself recently made clear, it is ultimately "in relation to some other basic currency that new values can be established . . . Thus dollar prices are destined sooner or later to be the basis of the new financial equilibrium, and this implies a rise in European prices expressed in European currencies." It would be difficult to express more lucidly the fact that no solution has been found, and that on the contrary the economic regression will constantly increase with each "orthodox" attempt to restore the balance.

As the end-product of this most regrettable obstinacy, all one can foresee is that Europe will fall into its natural orbit, which is the East. If America wants to prevent this, the first step it should take—the one essential step—consists in recognizing with the least possible delay, the fact that the western community is a political community. All the rest would logically follow the recognition of this truth, for a political community is not a new social entity, and no special effort of the imagination is needed to discover the principles that govern its existence. The primary political cell is the nation.

To simplify things, consider the

American nation. It is not economically homogeneous. It contains regions that are rich, others that are poor, overpopulated zones and others that are deserts, industries that are growing, industries that are declining—the classes of its society are unequally privileged. Were it left for a few years at the mercy of the free play of economics exclusively, disintegration would follow.

However, in America, this free play is, of course, limited and compensated for (the quarrel between planning and free enterprise has nothing whatever to do with these considerations) by constantly balancing factors, of which taxes and free interior migration furnish the two principal examples. Another method of compensation is the TVA in which a less developed region is furnished with modern resources at the expense of richer zones.

All these compensating techniques are anti-economic by definition. They are, however, the basic conditions for the survival of any political agglomeration. And to pass from the American example to the western community, the only difference is one of dimension. The principles are the same. One does not see why something that is considered healthy and useful when applied to ten million square kilometers should be considered artificial when applied to thirty. It is proposed on the one hand to bring into existence a western community, and on the other hand to slow down and finally eliminate the Marshall Plan. Meanwhile barriers to emigration will presumably be maintained, and Europe will be forced to sell its products competitively in the United States in order to build its dollar reserves. This is precisely equivalent to proclaiming tomorrow that no more taxes need be paid in the United States and that henceforth the South must balance exchanges with the North.

All we need is to admit a simple idea: Nothing is artificial or costly that serves to bind together the community. Politically speaking, the Marshall Plan or the Berlin airlift, multiplied fivefold, are among the most natural things in the world; whereas a return to the classic system of exchanges is the most artificial of concepts. To persist in the economic obsession as a solution can lead only to a profound crisis and the abandonment of Europe to itself.

—J. J. SERVAN SCHREIBER



Lilienthal Believes . . .



Traditional democratic theory consigns the administrator to a plodding and uninspiring role. He must carry out the laws that the legislator frames; he is considered a servant without a will of his own, without imagination, and even without any great degree of technical skill. In Great Britain the high civil servant may acquire, through long experience and devotion to the standards of his profession, a place apart—a power capable of informing, and indeed at times of controlling, the Executive. His American counterpart is not so fortunate. He remains a misfit in the constitutional system, condemned as a “bureaucrat,” suspected of not earning his pay, and subject to irking Congressional investigations.

The variety and scope of the tasks undertaken by modern government have been gradually compelling a re-evaluation of the administrator's role. These tasks, moreover, have brought upon the scene a group of men who cannot be contained within the narrow limits which past theory allots them. In the Secretaryship of Agriculture at the start of the New Deal, Henry Wallace (as his present course might lead

us to forget) showed that administration could not only be an art, but a very human art, and an essential element of the democratic process. A legislative enactment, he and the men around him perceived, laid down the broad outlines of an undertaking; but the way its details were filled in and its injunctions applied determined in the end the whole character of the law.

Today the outstanding example of the new type of administrator is, of course, David E. Lilienthal. He is not only a human being of deep convictions and highly-developed ethical feelings; he has been entrusted with two precedent-setting tasks—responsibility for the Tennessee Valley Authority in its formative stages, and for the Atomic Energy Commission since its inception. Each held untold possibilities, and each began to take final form as much from him as from the Congresses that shaped the laws. When Mr. Lilienthal writes a book setting forth the basis of his beliefs, it is bound to be significant. *This I Do Believe* (Harper & Brothers, \$2.50), fragmentary and discursive though it is, must take its place among the few volumes that define the nature and promise of the American experiment.

During the long investigation into Mr. Lilienthal's fitness for the AEC appointment, when the Congress of the United States was led by Senator Kenneth McKellar into depths of shame, and measures it may never exceed, the fact was almost completely ignored that his experience at the head of the TVA was the best possible preparation for his new job. Electricity, like atomic energy, is a kind of power the development and distribution of which can radically change the structure of society, exerting incalculable effects upon the way men live and work. One who had sensed the promise of electric power, had understood its capacity to

transform a region and to vitalize democracy all along the line, seemed called as if by destiny to grapple with the problems of atomic energy.

Mr. Lilienthal, in any case, has not been unaware of a similarity in the two tasks. The ideas he had shaped during his stewardship of the TVA he carried with him to the AEC. They form the burden of the remarkable statement of faith (now reprinted as a foreword) that he poured out in answer to Senator McKellar's vicious baiting, and, spelled out, they make the substance of the new book. These ideas derive basically from belief in man as a child of God, and belief in America as a testing ground where the free spirit can seek out the means of its fulfillment. Translated into articles of faith more specifically born of his experience as a public servant, Mr. Lilienthal's ideas challenge many of the accepted dogmas and priorities.

There is, for example, his overriding belief in the value of decentralization. There is absolute insistence that science is a moral function and must serve moral ends. There is the conviction that the expert must be subjected at every turn to the judgment of laymen, and that the career administrator must be supplemented by men who come fresh into government with the understandings and predispositions of private life.

Such ideas, tenaciously held and pursued, can lead to surprising results. “The objective [of the AEC],” he states, “should be to get the atomic development back into the mainstream of democratic economic life and gradually to denationalize an industry born nationalized.” That aim, irreproachable as it would seem, has struck some of Mr. Lilienthal's detractors as unpatriotic and radical. He remarks somewhat ruefully how attempts at decentralization have run counter to “forceful op-

position and sincere criticism" from conservative Congressmen. The same groups that had misconceived the whole nature of the TVA experiment, attacking it on the ground that it enforced a monolithic authority over the free and diverse life of the community, attack the AEC's practice of farming out to private industry as much as possible of its work; or else they insist upon ironbound controls over every subordinate enterprise.

Mr. Lilienthal's belief that public opinion should be the final judge of policy led to the suspicion that he was anxious to give away the secrets of the bomb. His very lack of dogma created the impression that he was wedded to some sinister dogma of his own. Indeed, his whole experience illustrates the paradox that it is old truths, in the mind of a sincere and gifted person, that often appear most dangerous and new.

It is significant to compare Mr. Lilienthal's new book with his earlier *TVA—Democracy on the March*. That was primarily a description and a history; the philosophical conclusions emerged from tangible experiences with the river, the great valley, the soil, the forests, the new dams, and the men and women who lived in the region. The new book, as its title makes clear, begins and ends as a statement of faith. One gets the impression that this faith could not have emerged from what the author has seen and learned in the AEC; that he has had to impose it, rather, on a somewhat alien and intractable material. If the statement seem at places a little overoptimistic, a little shrill, it is the shrillness of a man who whistles when the going is rough.

Evidently it is possible to increase the participation of the public in the formation of atomic policy, and Mr. Lilienthal, by his influential public addresses and by his intelligible reports, has contributed greatly to keeping the public informed. But atomic energy, both because of its technical obscurities and the need for military secrecy, does not lend itself readily to this kind of treatment. It is possible to decentralize atomic experiment and manufacture; but it is not easy or natural to do so. The degree of success Mr. Lilienthal has achieved in enlisting the aid of private industry is praiseworthy. It hardly compares with the creative innova-

tions that made the TVA a laboratory of democracy. If there is one field where the expert must be set apart by a wide gulf from the layman, is it not the field of atomic energy?

Most important of all, can atomic energy become, like other sources of energy, a beneficent peacetime force? Basic to Mr. Lilienthal's whole philosophy is his conviction that the administrator is working, through science, for ethical and humane ends. Electricity becomes, in his imagination, more than a type of power; by its nature it is a civilizing, liberating, democratizing agent. The vision of electrical power being transported long distances across the valley, coming into the houses and barns of individual farmers and into the small decentralized workshop, setting men free from unnecessary drudgery and from dependence on the crowded urban mass—this gives meaning to the whole Tennessee Valley un-

in peacetime. On this point, the author's comparative restraint is suggestive. Certain applications in medicine have already been worked out, but these are in the nature of by-products. The problems involved in making the atom a safe, cheap, and efficient servant of man are still unsolved. Difficulties in the disposal of waste radioactive material could block progress.

Mr. Lilienthal never expressly doubts the relevance of his faith to the work he is now in—any more than he gives way to bitterness toward certain members of Congress. Both doubt and bitterness seem strangers to his nature. Yet he cannot help but have moods of wondering whether some gigantic hoax has not been perpetrated on man, in the form of a scientific discovery which might serve no enlightened purpose—a discovery inherently evil, and incapable of being domesticated. At such times the frustration of an individual career must seem minor compared to the frustration and tragedy that portend for the world.

A more moderate conclusion is no doubt nearer the truth. The development of the atom, though it cannot be completely subjected to the kind of standards and ideals that Mr. Lilienthal upholds, nevertheless needs desperately to have them applied within feasible limits. To know the value of his contribution we need only imagine what the AEC would be like if these ideals had not been a powerful and shaping force. It is an achievement that the public has been able to share even to a small extent in this undertaking; that labor in atomic plants has been able, under restrictions, to organize freely and to bargain; that private industry has been given a role.

If the day comes when atomic energy, shared with other nations and integrated into a free society, extends man's reach and lightens his load, David Lilienthal will share with a few scientists a niche among the heroes and prophets of the new age. And this little book will continue to be read, as an expression of the values that saved the world from what might have been merely a nightmare. Even if all this does not occur, the man and the book will be remembered—testimony that in its grimmest failure the human race had moments of sanity and faith.

—AUGUST HECKSCHER

TRUMAN REVEALS RED A-BLAST



SENATOR HICKENLOOPER: "This announcement completely emphasizes one of the vital objectives of my investigation now being conducted in this field."

dertaking. But can the same kind of vision be held in connection with atomic energy?

The question is not prompted solely by the dominant role of military development in the AEC. It is prompted by the more fundamental doubt, held in some degree by all those concerned with the atom, whether this source of power can ever become really useful

The Reader Reports

The articles appearing on these pages were contributed by readers in response to the theme question:

A democracy limits political power to protect the rights of the people: What limitations do you think are the most effective?

Vigilance and Awareness

The Bill of Rights Amendments to our Constitution provide a clear example of political limitations to protect the rights of the people under a democratic form of government. So far, those limitations have been effective. There are other examples: the British system of parliamentary responsibility, the American system of division of powers through checks and balances, Supreme Court reviews of legislation that have led to the "clear-and-present-danger" type of protective concept. But political limitations—constitutional, legislative, and judicial—to protect the rights of the people come and go. Witness the guarantees of democracy that were written into the German Constitution. The U.S.S.R. Constitution, of course, gets the Oscar in the guarantees-that-don't-mean-a-damn class.

Formal limitations of political power apparently work sometimes but are dismal failures at other times. The paradox is this: The degree of success is directly proportional to the attitude of the people. Those who are willing to take the trouble to make certain that their liberties are not destroyed keep their liberties. Those who fail to realize that freedom imposes certain responsibilities lose their liberties.

The fact that we in America are protected by the Bill of Rights; the fact that there have been, and are, guardians of people's rights like Justice Holmes and President Roosevelt, will mean absolutely nothing toward ensuring a

continuance of democratic privileges unless we in America are willing to maintain a constant watchfulness against usurpation of political power. The Fourteenth Amendment doesn't protect Negroes from Jim Crow. The First Amendment doesn't protect Jews from anti-Semitism.

Exceptional men of good will or apparently iron-bound limitations of political power will not protect the rights of the people in a democracy. In the last analysis, the only protection is in the people themselves. Their neglect will bring slavery. Their vigilance and awareness will insure freedom.

DONALD J. COLEN
Great Neck, New York

The Unjelled Society

A democracy's most effective limitation on political power is its firm recognition, through law and tradition, of the factor of change. Constitutional amendments, regular elections, the legislative process—all contribute to the fashioning of a channel for change in social needs and thinking.

By providing for growth in social outlooks, and for periodic turnover in the executive power commissioned to realize social goals, a democracy ensures itself against becoming a case-hardened, finished product. That is the people's best protection against organized society's tendency toward overorganization—democratic society's explicit and implicit acceptance of the fact that it is never final but is always becoming.

True, in a democracy, as elsewhere, change often lags behind the need for it. Still, this kind of uncrystallized, never-quite-jelled society always leaves a crack in its organizational walls through which popular sentiment, wrong or right, can ultimately seep. Let the people beware of bargain-basement dogma that claims to be the last, unchangeable, inevitable word in political rightness.

A second effective limitation on political power is the provision for extensive right of appeal. An initial decision affecting an individual seldom closes the matter. Almost always there is some avenue toward higher judg-

Instructions to Reader Contributors

Theme: "To what extent do you think our foreign policy has been affected by the Russian achievement of the atomic bomb?"

1. All contributors should state the question to which the letter is in answer.
2. Letters should not exceed four hundred words.
3. Contributors are asked to print name, address, and occupation.
4. Contributions should be addressed to Reader Contributions, *The Reporter*, 220 East 42 Street, New York 17, New York.
5. Contributions to be printed will be selected by The Editors.
6. Each contributor whose letter is printed will receive a check for \$25.00.
7. All contributions, whether printed or not, will become the property of *The Reporter*.
8. All contributions on this issue's question must be postmarked not later than November 15, 1949.

Reader contributors are asked to follow instructions carefully in order to avoid confusion between contributions on the theme-question and regular Letters to the Editor.

ment, some opening to another source of relief from injustice.

Finally, there is the bulwark of civil liberties—a code of conduct toward persons and ideas setting a minimum standard of political decency below which social behavior shall not fall. Yes, this standard is violated, sometimes outrageously. And each violation must be fought as though it were the only crucial issue on which the entire structure of freedom rests—as it does.

But the mere fact that civil liberties have to, and can, be fought for, proves that they are substantially there.

LAWRENCE RAVITZ
New York City

Moral Law

The most effective limitation is when we ask ourselves that basic question, "Is it right?"

The Constitution, of course, sets forth the rules and regulations of political life, but actually it is the American's judgment of right and wrong that designates the limitation. The rules of our democracy make it possible for us to fire any official, revoke laws, or make new laws changing the rules of the game, to tax the rich or aid the poor, but these are not accomplished until the majority has approved.

Moral law is implanted in the hearts of people everywhere, and no one can rightfully oppose one who reflects that moral law. Even the most hard-boiled politician recognizes this most clearly, and the nefarious always hasten to get on the right side of any moral question. Moral force is the only force that can accomplish great things in our world, and at the same time is the most effective brake on any runaway attempt to gain political power in our democracy.

This is a result of a principle that has guided our form of government, and not the result of chance or mere fortune. That principle is clear; it guided the men who wrote the Constitution. It is a belief in the dignity and rights of the individual, and the belief that we can rightfully settle differences when and if they arise.

We are guaranteed this right of limitation by the Constitution. We keep it and prevent seizure of unusual political power as long as we can successfully answer, "Is it right?"

ALFRED M. FUNK
Salt Lake City, Utah

Letters

To The Reporter

Schmid's Record

To the Editor: "Ten German Politicians," by John Scott, in your October 11 number, contains the information that Carlo Schmid, Social Democratic whip in the Bonn Parliament, was a military government official in the Pas de Calais during the Nazi occupation of France.

This news is not as astonishing as is the equanimity with which *The Reporter* presents this gem. If the facts are as reported, Schmid should be removed from his seat and excluded from political life.

Gen. Eisenhower has repeatedly stressed that the German High Command expected the cross-Channel invasion to be launched at the Pas de Calais, as the shortest approach to Germany. For this reason its strongest force, the Fifteenth Army, was concentrated in that area.

In that situation the function of any kind of military-government official would be to conciliate the conquered population and render less likely their assistance to the liberators. If Schmid played this role, it says nothing in his favor that "he managed to maintain good relations with the French." The same would be partly true of Otto Abetz.

This, and the mere fact of Schmid's having served in any capacity in the overrunning of a country friendly to the U. S., should be grounds for action under the reserved powers of the Occupation Statute.

JOHN D. O'NEIL
Washington, D. C.

Whose Welfare, Whose State?

To the Editor: Mr. Schlesinger's excellent article on the welfare state in your October 11 issue prompts me to make two observations:

What about abandoning the antithesis welfare state vs. non-welfare state? If it is true that the state came into existence to satisfy a need for protection and personal security, however different the means through which these ends are realized, every state contains elements of welfarism. Agreement on measures to be introduced is difficult if the basis of the argument is welfare state vs. non-welfare state; agreement may be easier if the discussion centers on the degree of welfare to be guaranteed by the state. It would be well to keep in mind that for generations great minds have confused the issues in discussing the relative advantages and disadvantages of *laissez-faire* and state intervention in economic affairs, for-

getting that the state, at least through taxation, always intervenes in economic affairs, and that the proper subject for discussion would have been the degree of state intervention.

In the second place, wouldn't it be an advantage for Mr. Schlesinger and his friends to emphasize, not the welfare state as such, but the concrete steps to be adopted in order to realize it? When British radicals stood for "eight hours to work, eight hours to play, eight hours to rest, eight shillings a day," they were on solid ground. Once they began to stand for socialism their position became less secure, because socialism, like any other ism, can mean almost anything.

Europeans have shown great ability in raising themselves from the level of concrete problems to that of abstractions; and we feel today the effects of the resulting crashes. It may be an advantage for Americans to act otherwise, even if greater precision leads to the loss of some supporters.

MAX SALVADORI
Northampton, Massachusetts

Contributors

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—The Editors

In Germany: a peek into the Russian Zone for twenty pfennigs

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*NEXT
ISSUE*

The Reporter Examines

THE UNITED NATIONS

In the Critical Fall of 1949